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Abstract
Quantum communications and quantum cryptography are developing rapidly during
the last decades caused partly by a fast progress in quantum computing. Quantum cryp-
tography provides an unconditionally secure way of communicating whereas traditional
classical cryptographic protocols are likely to be broken by super powerful quantum com-
puters. In the past few years distances covered by quantum communications have increased
by an order of magnitude. To provide a global coverage for the quantum networks, a satel-
lite based quantum communications is the most promising solution.
As an emerging field, QKD systems are still under evolution process. Despite outstand-
ing security proven theoretically, it has loopholes caused by their implementations. To test
QKD, find the possible loopholes and suggest ways to fix them, is a job of many scientific
groups. In this thesis I start with presenting my work for a securing test of a commercial
QKD system Clavis2. A Trojan-horse attack on Bob’s apparatus was prepared by testing
reflections and transmissions of all optical components in Bob’s scheme. The attack was
implemented and found to be unsuccessful at the tested wavelengths due to afterpulsing
effect in Bob’s single-photon detectors reacting to the bright light attack pulses.
Three chapters of the thesis are dedicated to custom built single-photon detectors
(SPDs) based on commercial Silicon avalanche photodiodes (APDs). Those detectors
demonstrate parameters that altogether are not possible to find in commercially available
SPDs, especially if combined with a very compact size. One of the in-lab-built SPDs was
implemented in 143 km teleportation experiment, where a low dark count rate was crucial
for the success of the experiment. The next generation SPD is already built, characterized
and ready to be implemented.
Another 4-channel SPD was built as a prototype for a quantum satellite SPD. It has
light weight, low electrical power consumption, low dark count rate and decent other pa-
rameters. It was used in the airborne demonstration of QKD receiver payload experiment,
when a secret key was successfully generated between a moving aircraft and a ground
station.
SPDs installed on a satellite have to be able to work in the harsh space environment
during a mission life time. Space radiation dramatically increases dark count rate of APDs.
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The last project presented in the thesis committed to a radiation test of three types of
APDs and one type of photo multiplier tube. The experiment included characterization
of all SPDs before and after irradiation by four levels of proton radiation, equivalent to
3 months – 2 years duration in a 600 km low Earth orbit. Three methods for mitigating
radiation damage were tested and found to be successful with perspective to use some of
them on a quantum satellite to extent life time of SPDs.
To summarize, this work makes a contribution to the development of SPDs for global
quantum communications.
Outline
The thesis is structured as follows. In chapter 1 a brief introduction to quantum com-
munications is presented. In chapter 2, the overview of SPDs suitable for long-distance
quantum communications is provided. In chapter 3, an experimental Trojan-horse attack
on a commercial QKD is described. In chapter 4 a quantum teleportation over 143 km
experiment, used custom built SPDs, is described. In chapter 5, an improved afterpulsing
analysis for ultra low noise SPDs is demonstrated. In chapter 6, a low temperature super
low-noise in-lab built SPD is presented. In chapter 7, an in-lab built detector prototype
for Airborne demonstration of QKD is presented. In chapter 8, a radiation test of SPDs is
described. Chapter 9 provides conclusive remarks and outlook on the work.
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Chapter 1
Introduction to quantum cryptography and
quantum communications
Secure communication was always in interest in all human societies. The oldest
known cryptographic example of non-standard hieroglyphs carved into the wall of
a tomb is dated around 1900 BCE, was found in Egypt. Also, clay tablets from
Mesopotamia dated around 1500 BCE were found, containing encrypted commer-
cially valuable information. Over the following centuries, cryptographic techniques
transitioned from simple substitution and transposition cyphers to a “one-time pad”
– the only unbreakable classical cypher, that was described first by Frank Miller in
1882 [1], then patented by Gilbert S. Vernam with use of XOR operation for one-time
pad in 1919 [2], and proven to be secure by Shannon in 1949 [3]. In this protocol, ev-
ery symbol in a message is paired with a random secret key, that must be pre-shared
between the communicating parties. Every secret key should be used only once, thus,
the whole secret key should be of the size of the plain text. Then the main problem
of cryptography is in secure distribution of the secret key.
Prior to World War II, mathematical cryptanalysis was developed, leading to in-
vention of mechanical and electromechanical cypher machines. The famous rotor
cypher machine Enigma was implemented by German army, and first version was
successfully hacked by Polish Cipher Bureau, and British cryptographers hacked the
following version, which made a tremendous breakthrough in the cryptography his-
tory.
All cryptographic techniques used before 1983 can be classified as “classic” cryptog-
raphy. The quantum cryptography started in 1983 when Stephen Wiesner published
his paper “Conjugate Coding” [4], that first represented a conjugate coding used two
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principals of quantum mechanics. The first one is Heisenberg uncertainty principle,
dated 1927 [5], saying that as much the position of an electron is determined pre-
cisely, the less precisely its momentum can be determined, and vice versa. That leads
to the fact that it is impossible to measure quantum property of a particle without
changing its other parameters. The second principle is the “No-cloning theorem” [6]
saying, that it is impossible to create a copy of an arbitrary unknown quantum state
without disturbing it. This gives an opportunity to send quantum states between two
communicating parties (commonly named Alice and Bob in cryptography) without
a possibility for a malicious party (named Eve) to learn the quantum bits secretly.
Based on the Wiesner paper, in 1984 Charles H. Bennett and Gilles Brassard pro-
posed a quantum cryptographic protocol for secure communication [7], later referred
as BB84 protocol.
1.1 BB84
Suggested by Charles H. Bennett and Gilles Brassard quantum key distribution
(QKD) protocol [7] can be implemented to different degrees of freedom of quan-
tum particles. In the paper it was described for a polarization degree of freedom of
photons.
Figure 1.1: Principle of the BB84 protocol
(Re-printed from [8].)
Alice initiates the protocol by generating a photon in one out of four polarizations.
She uses two non-orthogonal bases: one is a horizontal/ vertical (HV) basis and
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another one is a diagonal/ anti-diagonal (DA) basis. Each basis is used to encode 0
and 1 bits, H and D are for 0, V and A are for 1. Then, she sends the photon to Bob.
Bob randomly chooses a basis for the measurement of the arriving photon’s polar-
ization. It results 50% of photons measured in correct basis, and the measurement
result is the same as Alice’s setting for those photons. When the basis choice is
incorrect, it results in random results of 0, 1 with 50% probability each.
After a certain number of photons transmitted and measured, the second part of the
protocol starts. Over an authenticated public channel (e.g., internet) Bob reveals
to Alice, which measurement basis he used for each photon. Alice communicates
to Bob when the basis choice was correct and when not. If an eavesdropper listens
to the open channel, it will not provide him any information about the bit values
sent. Proper authentication must guarantee that Eve is not participating in this
conversation, pretending to be Alice or Bob. Then, Alice and Bob keep only those
bits when their bases were the same. It is called a sifted key.
After Alice and Bob got sifted key, they use a portion of it to check errors level:
they reveal bits values over the public authenticated channel and compare. There
is always some fraction of errors due to equipment imperfection. An important
parameter used for description of quantum cryptography protocols – quantum bit
error ratio (QBER), determined as
QBER =
Ni
Ni +Nc
, (1.1)
where Ni is number of incorrect detected bits, and Nc is number of correct bits. Ni
and Nc are determined by direct comparing of measured bits.
A straight-forward attack would be the so called ’intercept and resend’ attack, in
which an eavesdropper (Eve) tries to measure photons in the quantum channel be-
tween Alice and Bob, thereby implementing the same protocol as Bob. Eve resends
the results to Bob. Because in 50% of the cases, Even will measure in the incorrect
basis, she will inevitably introduce a random bit values in the signals passed to Bob.
Therefore, once Bob’s measurements are completed, the number of incorrect bits be-
tween Alice and Bob will increase to 25%. Thus, Eve’s attempt to steal information
introduce additional errors.
The next stage of the protocol is the error correction. Alice and Bob implement classi-
cal error correction protocol [9] to get identical bit sets. During this step Eve obtains
some additional information listening public channel, which needs to be estimated
and corrected by the next step.
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To finally obtain a secure key, Alice and Bob perform privacy amplification procedure
[9], when their obtained bit strings mapped to a smaller secure bits set, called secret
key.
The protocol BB84 is theoretically proven to be secure when QBER is less than 11%
[10].
1.2 Weak coherent source
True single photon sources are more complicated and can be difficult to implement in
practice. More often a heavily attenuated laser pulse is used for QKD, which is called
weak coherent pulse (WCP). Then the photon number distribution is described by a
Poisson distribution:
P (n|µ) = (µ)
n
n!
exp(−µ), where
P(n—µ) is the probability that the laser emits n photons in a pulse given the mean
photon number per pulse is µ. When laser pulses are attenuated that µ is low enough
(0.1-0.01), most pulses will contain only one photon, and small portion of pulses will
carry two photons or more.
Other QKD protocols were proposed shortly afterwards, specifically, in 1991 Artur
Ekert suggested a scheme using entangled pairs of photons (protocol E91) [11], in 1992
Charles Bennett proposed a protocol utilizing only two non-orthogonal polarizations
instead of four in BB84 (protocol B92) [9].
For practical implementations of QKD BB84 is the most widely implemented. In
practice, QKD systems often use weak coherent laser pulses instead of true single
photon sources because these are much easier to implement. A drawback of this
solution is that the system gets vulnerable to a photon-number splitting attack (PNS)
[9, 12, 13]. This attack exploits the fact that the photon distribution for weak coherent
pulses are described by Poisson statistics, and some pulses contain more than one
photons. An eavesdropper could split a photon from those multi-photons pulses,
and do the measurement, without being noticed. This leads to a security loophole.
The mean photon number µ is small (much less than 1) for BB84 prototcol, then a
probability for a multi-photon pulse is approximately µ2/2. Fortunately, adaptations
of the protocol implementations were discovered which make implementations robust
against the PNS-attack. In 2003 W. Y. Hwang proposed a decoy state protocol [14].
Also, in 2004 V. Scarani, A. Acin, G. Ribordy and N. Gisin published a new protocol
[15], robust against PNS attack (SARG04).
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1.3 Decoy state protocol
In the BB84 protocol with decoy states [14, 16, 17], in addition to signal pulses
carrying encoded bits for the BB84 protocol, Alice generates and sends to Bob decoy
pulses with different µ. The decoy pulses are not used for the secret key generation,
but serve only for detecting attacks. Alice keeps records which pulses belongs to
which distribution and at the sifting stage announces intensity for the each pulse.
For an eavesdropper it is impossible to recognize the observed channel transmission, a
pulse statistics when multiple intensity levels implemented, but for a successful PNS
attack Eve needs to know the photon number statistics. Checking QBER separately
for each intensity level, Alice and Bob can therefore discover a possible PNS attack.
With the decoy states PNS attack can still be done, but not as effective.
1.4 SARG04 protocol
The SARG protocol [15] can be realized on the same hardware as BB84, as it uses
also four non-orthogonal states. Alice randomly sends to Bob one of states (|H〉,
|V 〉, |D〉, |A〉). Bob measures the state in a randomly chosen basis (HV or DA).
After a string of quantum states sent, Alice and Bob do a sifting procedure over a
public authenticated channel, which is different from the BB84 protocol. Alice reveals
over public channel a pair to which the sent photon belongs: (|V 〉 , |D〉), (|V 〉 , |A〉),
(|H〉 , |D〉), (|V 〉 , |A〉). Within each set the photons are non-orthogonal.
Suppose, Alice sent the |H〉 state and announced the (|H〉 , |A〉) pair. First, suppose,
Bob used HV basis for the measurement, which happens with probability 50%. Then
he certainly observed H as a result. But this result is possible for both states in the
announced pair, so Bob has to discard the result. Now suppose, Bob used DA basis
for the measurement, and got A in result, then he also cannot discriminate what
state was sent. But if Bob measures in DA basis and got D in the result, he will
know with 100% probability that the sent state was |H〉. Finally Bob will obtain a
raw key that is 1/4 of the sent bits, which is half of that comparing to BB84.
But for the SARG04 protocol Eve will not benefit from PNS attack on two-photon
pulses. As Bob’s measurement basis is never revealed, she cannot know what state
he obtained. Eve could benefit from three-photon pulses, but of the µ is kept low,
they are very rare. Thus, the SARG04 protocol is more secure against PNS attack
than BB84.
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1.5 Polarization and phase encoding
In the considered QKD protocols polarization encoding were implemented. For free-
space quantum channels polarization coding suits very well. However, if a standard
telecommunication optical fibers are chosen as a quantum channel, photon polariza-
tion can rotate due to the birefringence effect. Then the phase encoding [9, 18–20]
or time-bin encoding [21, 22] serves better.
For the phase encoding a relative phase between two close pulses is used. A pair of
identically unbalanced March-Zehnder interferometers with phase modulators in one
arm are used for Alice and Bob. To encode a bit and choose the basis Alice chooses
one of four the phase modulator setting (±pi/4,±3pi/4). Then Bob randomly applies
a phase shift of ±pi/4 to choose the measurement basis.
The QKD protocol for the phase coding is very similar to the polarization coding. It
was shown in [18] that the phase and polarization encoding are formally isomorphic to
each other and each parameter in the phase coding has its analog in the polarization
protocol.
1.6 Plug-n-play system
Both polarization and phase encoding implemented for a fiber based systems require
active compensations for possible fluctuations over the quantum channel. A straight-
forward solution is to send additional more intense pulses and check their properties,
then, apply accordingly a compensation (phase drift of polarization) for the quan-
tum states pulses. However for effective work of such scheme, the adjustment pulses
should be send quite often, that will slow down the protocol and decrease the secret
key rate.
An elegant solution for this problem was suggested by Martinelli in 1992 [23], that
allows passively compensate fluctuations in optical fiber, using Faraday mirror. A
pulse travels front and back in the system through the same optical conditions. After
a pulse starts at Bob’s side, it gets reflected at Alice’s end by the Faraday mirror, it
returns to Bob orthogonal to its original state with all birefringence effects compen-
sated [18].
To implement the phase encoding QKD, the method was combined with time mul-
tiplexing in long-path interferometer [24, 25]. In the Fig. 3.1 the scheme of the
self-aligned plug-n-play system shown.
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Figure 1.2: Scheme of plug-n-play system
Self-aligned plug-n-play system: LD, laser diode; APD, avalanche diode; C1, C2, fiber couplers;
PMA, PMB, phase modulators; PBS, polarizing beamsplitter; DL, optical delay line; FM,
Faraday mirror; DA, classical detector. (Re-printed from [18].)
A laser located at Bob’s end emits pulses, which travel by one of two ways: through
the long or short arm of Bob’s interferometer. Then, the pulses travel through the
Quantum Channel (optical fiber) channel, and are reflected by the Faraday mirror
at Alice’s location, and their phase is modulated according to a phase encoding
protocol. Faraday mirror reflects light rotating its polarization by 90 degree. After
they arrive to Bob’s side again, because of the PBS the pulses travel another arm
of the interferometer than they did initially, Bob applies a phase shift on his phase
modulator choosing the measurement basis, and finally the pulses got combined at
the fiber coupler C1 and interfere. Single-photon detector register the output port of
the photon, providing his quantum state.
1.7 Bell state measurement
Bell states are the simplest two-qubit maximally entangled quantum states named
after John S. Bell who used them to violate his Bell inequality [26]. The states are:
∣∣Φ+〉
AB
=
1√
2
(|0〉A |0〉B + |1〉A |1〉B) , (1.2)
∣∣Φ−〉
AB
=
1√
2
(|0〉A |0〉B − |1〉A |1〉B) , (1.3)
∣∣Ψ+〉
AB
=
1√
2
(|0〉A |1〉B + |1〉A |0〉B) , (1.4)
∣∣Ψ−〉
AB
=
1√
2
(|0〉A |1〉B − |1〉A |1〉B) . (1.5)
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The Bell state measurement (BSM) is a core operation for the quantum teleportation
protocol. For a two-qubit state the BSM results in a projection of the states onto a
Bell state, indicating correlation between the qubits. The Bell-states form a basis,
and any two qubit state can be represented as a superposition of the Bell states:
|S〉 = α+
∣∣Φ+〉+ α− ∣∣Φ−〉+ β+ ∣∣Ψ+〉+ β− ∣∣Ψ−〉 . (1.6)
Then in the result of the BSM, e.g., a probability |α+|2 to find the state |S〉 in the
Bell state |Φ+〉 can be obtained.
If two qubits before the Bell measurement were not entangled, they will be projected
onto one of four Bell states and emerge entangled after this protocol.
1.8 Quantum teleportation protocol
The quantum teleportation transfers quantum information (a state of a quantum
particle) over some distance, using classical communication channel and pre-shared
quantum entangled particles between two communicating parties.
The quantum teleportation idea was first introduced by Charles Bennett at al. in
1993 in Ref. [27].
Alice and Bob initially share an entangled Bell state:∣∣Φ+〉
AB
=
1√
2
(|0〉A |0〉B + |1〉A |1〉B) , (1.7)
and Alice posses a quantum state |ψ〉C = α |0〉C +β |1〉C , which she wants to transfer
to Bob. Then, the state of the total system is :
∣∣Φ+〉
AB
⊗ |ψ〉C =
(
1√
2
(|0〉A |0〉B + |1〉A |1〉B)
)
⊗ (α |0〉C + β |1〉C) . (1.8)
Representing the Alice’s two qubits in the Bell states basis, using the following iden-
tities:
|0〉 ⊗ |0〉 = 1√
2
(∣∣Φ+〉+ ∣∣Φ−〉) (1.9)
|1〉 ⊗ |1〉 = 1√
2
(∣∣Φ+〉− ∣∣Φ−〉) (1.10)
|1〉 ⊗ |0〉 = 1√
2
(∣∣Ψ+〉− ∣∣Ψ−〉) (1.11)
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|0〉 ⊗ |1〉 = 1√
2
(∣∣Ψ+〉+ ∣∣Ψ−〉) , (1.12)
the total system state can be written:∣∣Φ+〉
AB
⊗ |ψ〉C
=
1
2
{∣∣Φ+〉
AC
⊗ (α |0〉B + β |1〉B)
+
∣∣Φ−〉
AC
⊗ (α |0〉B − β |1〉B)
+
∣∣Ψ+〉
AC
⊗ (α |0〉B + β |1〉B)
+
∣∣Ψ−〉
AC
⊗ (α |0〉B − β |1〉B)}.
(1.13)
Now Alice performs the measurement in the Bell states basis (|Φ+〉AC , |Φ−〉AC ,
|Ψ+〉AC , |Ψ−〉AC) leaving the system in one of four states:∣∣Φ+〉
AC
⊗ (α |0〉B + β |1〉B) (1.14)
∣∣Φ−〉
AC
⊗ (α |0〉B − β |1〉B) (1.15)
∣∣Ψ+〉
AC
⊗ (α |0〉B + β |1〉B) (1.16)
∣∣Ψ−〉
AC
⊗ (α |0〉B − β |1〉B). (1.17)
The measurement changed the state of the system, the Alice’s two particles are
entangled now, and the originally entangled particles are not entangled anymore.
Alice sends to Bob information about results of her measurement through a classical
channel. According to that information Bob applies a unitary operation to his qubit
to obtain the teleported state |ψ〉 = α |0〉+ β |1〉.
If Alice informs Bob that she obtained |Φ+〉, Bob knows his qubit is already in the
state |ψ〉 = α |0〉+ β |1〉.
If Alice informs Bob that she obtained |Φ−〉, Bob has to implement the Pauli’s matrix
σz = σ3 =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
to obtain the desired result.
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If Alice informs Bob that she obtained |Ψ+〉, Bob has to implement
σx = σ1 =
[
0 1
1 0
]
.
If Alice informs Bob that she obtained |Ψ−〉, Bob has to implement
iσy = iσ2 =
[
0 −1
1 0
]
.
1.9 Quantum communications development
Quantum communications including QKD are actively developing during the last
decades [7, 9, 15, 27–39]. Not the last reason for that is the fast progress in quantum
computing field [27, 40–49]. Skyrocketing computation power of quantum computers
will create a threat for security of existing classical cryptographic protocols widely
used for secure communications in modern society, because security of many of the
classical cryptographic protocols for key establishment based on assumption of a lim-
ited computation power of a potential eavesdropper [40, 50, 51]. Although there is a
large research on post-quantum cryptography [51] seeking to develop algorithms resis-
tant to powerful attacks from quantum computers, quantum cryptography suggests
itself as an excellent solution for a secure communication due to its “un-breakable”
nature based on quantum physics.
Because of that reason, QKD presently is the most commercialized area of quan-
tum communications. In particular, a Swiss company ID Quantique commercializes
QKD systems, including quantum key generation, distribution and quantum safe
network encryption. Their main customers are from governments, banking, industry
and academy. Also, China started implementing quantum communications widely.
Several research groups are building a biggest quantum network in the world that
connects Beijing, Shanghai, Hefei and Jinan with its total length of about 2000 km
[36, 52] and utilizing 32 trusted nods. In purpose to extend the quantum network to
global scale, a quantum satellite can be used. Distances for quantum communications
on the ground are limited by some hundreds kilometers due to losses either in optical
fiber or in atmosphere [19, 33, 53–55] and losses scale with distance exponentially. In
the space environment there is no absorption and scattering losses, only diffraction
losses which scale with distance quadratically. For the ground to satellite link, main
losses will occur in the atmosphere part of the light path. Therefore, losses for the
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ground-to-satellite link will be lower than losses over the longest feasible distance in
free-space channel on the ground [56].
In 2016 China launched a quantum satellite [57] and already has tested entanglement
distribution [39], quantum teleportation [37] and QKD [38] over the 1200–1400 km
long quantum channel between the Earth ground station and the low-Earth orbit
satellite. It is a very important step in globalization of quantum communications, as
Earth-to-satellite quantum links straightforwardly lead to the global QKD network.
A satellite orbiting around the Earth establishes quantum links with two or more
locations on the ground and then those locations can share a secret key through a
trusted nod on the satellite [35, 56].
In 2017, the European Commission announced 1 billion euro project dedicated to
quantum technologies [58], which also includes developments for quantum communi-
cation and QKD.
1.10 Quantum communication with satellites
In April, 2017 the Canadian prime minister announced a start of Canadian quantum
satellite mission. Financing of about $80 million over five years was provided to
Canadian Space Agency (CSA) to develop emerging technologies. Part of this budget
is intended for development of quantum technologies in space involving Institute for
Quantum Computing in Waterloo. Tentatively, Canadian quantum satellite can be
launched in about 5 years.
Ground-to-satellite quantum communication can be realized in two directions: up-
link, when a quantum source is located on the ground and SPDs are on the satellite;
and down-link, when the source is on the satellite. Both variants have their benefits
and drawbacks, considered in details in the Ref. [56]. The up-link is more beneficial
for the scientific or technology demonstration mission, as it provides a freedom to test
different protocols, implement different sources, interchanging them on the ground.
Taking into account the lifetime of a satellite (usually 5-10 years) and a possibility of
inventing new better sources of quantum states, it looks very reasonable to place the
receiver on a satellite. The choice of potential candidates SPDs for the quantum satel-
lites is considered in the next chapter. The harsh space environment requires SPDs
able to withstand and work successful as quantum receivers. That leads to necessity
of special tests for potential candidates SPDs, and building of custom detectors.
The projects presented in this thesis are dedicated mostly to work on long distance
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quantum communications, towards developing Earth-to-satellite quantum communi-
cations, and particularly, QKD. Also, one project was about testing a commercial
QKD system security.
My contribution to the projects mainly consisted of a work on single-photon detectors
(SPDs) for quantum communications.
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Chapter 2
Single-photon detectors for long distance
quantum communications
In this chapter requirements to SPDs for quantum communications and an overview
of available SPDs will be provided.
2.1 Requirements to SPDs for quantum communications
In this section we discuss SPD’s parameters important for quantum communications
and limiting our choice of detectors.
2.1.1 Wavelength
Wavelength choice for free space quantum communications is determined by an opti-
mal wavelength for transmission through the ground-to-satellite optical channel and
by available quantum source wavelengths. Consideration of an optimal wavelength
through the atmosphere takes into account atmospheric transmittance windows, an-
gle of an optical link, diffraction, scattering, turbulence and absorption losses. The
detailed analysis was done by J.-P. Bourgoin [56], the results of numerical simulation
is shown in the Fig. 2.1.
Diffraction losses are smaller for shorter wavelengths, whereas atmospheric transmit-
tance and turbulence losses are smaller for longer wavelengths.
Considered sources are either laser source of WCP, or entangled photon source.
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Figure 2.1: Simulated atmospheric transmittance.
Simulated atmospheric transmittance at a typical rural location, for propagation at zenith (left)
and for different elevation angles (right). Colored lines represent wavelengths of commercially
available laser systems. Several transmission windows are evident, within which optical
transmission would experience low loss. Generally, the transmission tends to be better at higher
wavelengths, but other factors (e.g. diffraction, sources and detectors) must be taken into
account to properly determine the best wavelength choice. (Re-printed from [56].)
2.1.2 Important parameters of SPDs
Choosing SPDs for quantum communications we consider many parameters: dark
count rate, quantum detection efficiency, timing jitter, afterpulsing, maximum detec-
tion rate, size of the sensitive area. A table presenting characteristics for most of the
available SPDs is shown in the Fig. 2.2.
• Dark count rate is false counts or noise of SPDs. They arise through different
mechanisms depending on the SPD’s structure and materials. E.g., in APDs
most of dark counts are caused by thermal excitation and depend on temper-
ature of APDs; in PMTs dark count pulses originate from thermal emission
of electrons from the photocathode and dynodes; in superconducting nanowire
SPDs (SNSPDs) dark counts caused by intrinsic processes are extremely low,
can be less than 10−4 cps [60].
Dark counts in SPDs of receivers introduce errors for quantum communications.
For QKD dark counts are increasing QBER. For the teleportation experiment
it was calculated (as shown later in the thesis) how DCR affects data collection
time.
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Figure 2.2: Comparison of single-photon detectors.
(Re-printed from [59].)
• Detection efficiency is a probability of creating an output when a photon
hits a sensitive area of the detector. The highest detection efficiency over 90%
at 1542 nm was reported for SNSPDs [61]. For the visible wavelengths Si-
APD provide more than 50% efficiency [59]. In the UV range SNSPDs also
demonstrated the highest efficiency of 70–80% at 250–370 nm [60].
The higher detection efficiency of SPDs used for a QKD protocol increases secret
bit rate, making the system more efficient.
• Timing jitter describes a fluctuation of time intervals between absorption of
a photon by an SPD and output pulse, is usually measured as full-width half-
maximum (FWHM). It varies from 15 ps (for SNSPD [62]) to 300–400 ps (for
APDs and PMTs [59]). The timing jitter is limiting resolution of SPDs.
• Afterpulses are noise counts appeared after a registered count and caused
by intrinsic processes in some types of SPDs. In APDs afterpulses are caused
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by carriers trapped during an avalanche and spontaneously released after a
short time called traps life time, and induced a new avalanche. Si-APDs have
relatively low afterpulsing probability, 1% [63]; Ge- or InGaAs/InP have higher
afterpulsing probability, e.g., 5% with 5µs dead time [64]. Afterpulsing effect
was observed in SNSPDs as well [65], though it could be caused by the design
used.
Afterpulsing in SPDs implemented for quantum communications can be sup-
pressed by a properly chosen gate regime, or discarded during post-processing.
• Maximum count rate determines the maximum number of photons per second
that an SPD is able to count. APDs have a dead time (recovery time) after each
avalanche during that they are unable to register photons. The highest count
rate of 16.7 GHz was reported for SNSPDs working in 250–340 nm range [60].
• Diameter of sensitive area is a very important parameter for quantum com-
munication systems. Depending on an optical scheme implemented a bigger
sensitive area of SPDs allows to minimize losses, e.g., in the teleportation ex-
periment [33] our APD detectors with 500µm were implemented decreasing
losses due to turbulence caused beam moving.
2.2 SPDs suitable for quantum communications
The choice of SPDs for quantum communications is determined by the chosen wave-
length and other SPD’s parameters. Available SPDs can be divided by their re-
sponse spectral range: ultraviolet (≤ 400 nm), visible (400–1000 nm) and infrared
(950–1650 nm).
Infrared range is served by InGaAs or Ge APDs, and SNSPDs. The APDs have low
detection efficiency, high DCR and high afterpulsing probability. Whereas SNSPDs
made a significant progress and reached extremely good parameters in the last years
[60–62, 65–68] demonstrated very high detection efficiency, extremely low DCR, al-
most no afterpulsing and high resolution. They would be an excellent candidate for
ground-to-satellite quantum communications, but they require cryogenic cooling and
have very small sensitive area (few–tens µm), that make them not suitable for the
receiver on a small satellite.
Silicon based APD detectors work in the range 400–950 nm, providing photon de-
tection efficiency 50-65%, low DCR of 1–200 cps depending on bias voltage and tem-
perature, and maximum count rate of about 10 MHz. Si-APDs are well established
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technology, detectors do not require cryogenic cooling, usually thermo-electrical cool-
ers (TECs) are sufficient for operation. Also, the APD SPDs have a compact size
and do not have high demand for electrical power. All those considerations make
them a good candidate for a satellite mission.
For two types of APD detectors J.-P. Bourgoin made a simulation for QKD, showing
performance depending on wavelength in the range 450–1550 nm [56]. Also, simula-
tion of several quantum protocols as a function of SPD’s DCR was made. As a result
of the last, performance of QKD will be significantly limited at DCR of SPDs higher
than 250 cps per detector.
Another possible candidate for quantum satellite receiver can be PMTs. They were
first used for photon counting in 1949 [69], work in a wide spectral range (115–
1700 nm) and have been used in space for a long time. Also, they have big sensitive
area more than 10 mm. However, their detection efficiency is significantly lower (the
highest is 40% at 500 nm), they require high voltage (few kV) for operation and
have high afterpulsing rate comparing to APDs. Though microchannel plate PMTs
show the low timing jitter (about 20 ps) [70], PMTs are not our first option for the
quantum satellite receiver.
2.2.1 Si-APD
APDs are able to register light due to the photoelectric effect that converts light to
electricity. Their design provides in-built gain stage through avalanche multiplication
process. To be used for the single photon counting a reverse bias voltage applied to
the APD is set above APD’s breakdown voltage [71–74]. Then the APD is either in
a quiescent state with negligible current or in a state with self-sustaining avalanche
breakdown. The avalanche process can be triggered by a single carrier, thermally
exited, or resulted from ionization by a photon. To provide quenching for this current,
a high load resistor (more than 100 kΩ) can be connected between the APD and
the bias voltage source [71, 72]. This is called passive quenching method. After the
avalanche quenched, the APD restored in its zero-current state, and the voltage across
diode starts recovering up to its initially set value. The period after an avalanche
stopped and until an APD is able to produce the next avalanche is called dead-
time. To minimize the dead-time and operate the device at faster rate, an active
quenching circuit can be implemented [72, 75, 76]. The quenching transition is forced
a few nanosecond after an avalanche is triggered, and the APD can be held off for a
controlled time of about few nanosecond.
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DCR of APDs is mostly caused by thermally exited carriers which trigger avalanches
in the absence of any light. Cooling an APD decreases thermal energy of carriers,
and thus DCR of APDs decreases with temperature [74, 77].
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Chapter 3
Trojan-horse attack on commercial QKD
system
3.1 Trojan-horse attack experiment motivation
Though security of QKD based on laws of quantum mechanics and supposed to be
unbreakable, physical implementations of the QKD systems are not perfect and create
opportunities for hackers [78–84].
To improve the security of QKD systems, they need to be tested for possible loopholes
and side channels. One known potential vulnerability is called a Trojan-horse attack.
An eavesdropper tries to steal a secret information passing between Alice and Bob,
sending bright light pulses into the optical quantum channel and analyzing back
reflected photons properties [85, 86].
If a QKD system is working on BB84 protocol, phase or polarization encoding hap-
pens inside Alice’s system. Thus, an adversary can send a bright light pulses to
Alice side and analyze the information contained in back reflected signals, with the
goal of extracting information about Alice’s polarizer and phase modulator settings.
Because Bob’s modulators are classical devices which are operated in a linear optical
regime, they will not distinguish between Alice’s carefully powered pulse or a brighter
pulse from Eve. Following the classical information shared by Alice and Bob through
open channel during the post processing, Eve will obtain information about the raw
key. One method to prevent this, is installing a detector capable of monitoring the
incoming light intensity at Alice apparatus entrance.
When a QKD system employs SARG protocol [15, 87], the secret bits are given by
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Bob’s basis choice applied to the phase modulator. Eve implementing the Trojan-
horse attack could learn about Bob’s phase modulator settings, thus obtain informa-
tion about the raw key [88]. Then, listening open channel and following next steps
(sifting, error correction and privacy amplification) Eve would obtain the secret key
not leaving any foot prints.
Bob cannot prevent this attack by the same method as Alice. Inserting a monitoring
device will attenuate already quite weak light pulses, that will lead to a reduction
of the secret key rate. Neither can an optical isolator be implemented in the two-
way plug-n-play system, as Clavis2, because by the very principle of operation the
two-way transmission of signals is required.
We were able to demonstrate an experimental Trojan-horse attack on a running
commercial QKD system Clavis2. We sent bright pulses to the Bob’s apparatus and
analyzed the reflected photons passing through twice Bob’s phase modulator using
homodyne detection to learn the phase of the photons imprinted by Bob’s phase
modulator. Thus, the information about the raw key bits was revealed and the
security of the system is compromised.
3.2 Preparation for the Trojan horse attack experiment
The Fig. 3.1, b shows the optical scheme of the considered QKD system Clavis2,
manufactured by ID Quantique.
The QKD system is a plug-n-play two-way scheme [90], able to run BB84 and
SARG04 protocols. Our attack was intended for the Clavis2 running SARG04. Ac-
cordingly to a common assumption, Eve has access to the optical quantum channel,
and she inserts her apparatus in the line as shown in the Fig. 3.1, a. As required
by the implemented SARG04 protocol, Bob sends bright laser pulse pairs to Al-
ice, she attenuates pulses, prepares quantum states randomly applying a phase shift
φA = 0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2 and sends them back to Bob. Bob randomly applies a phase shift
φB = 0, pi/2 corresponding to the secret bits 0B or 1B, and measures quantum states.
The pulses are send in “frames”, and the length of the trains of pulses from Alice is
limited by the length of Alice’s delay line, that serves to separate incoming and out
coming pulses. The length of frames in the Clavis2 system under the experiment was
set to be of 215µs.
Eve needs to send her Trojan-pulses to Bob’s apparatus before or after a frame in a
time, that the Eve’s pulse (or its back-reflection from any optical component inside
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b)
a)
Figure 3.1: Optical schemes of Alice’s and Bob’s QKD system, and the scheme how Eve’s
apparatus could be inserted
a) Inserting Eve’s apparatus in the quantum channel between Alice and Bob
b) Alice and Bob optical schemes (Re-printed from [89])
Bob) will travel through Bob’s phase modulator (PM) while it is active. Then Eve’s
photons will have their phase modulated and Eve can get information about the PM
setting.
To prepare the Trojan-horse attack on Clavis2, we had to solve several question, like
timing of launched and reflected Eve’s light pulses, their wavelength and the best way
of back-reflected pulses analysis. I measured levels of reflection from Bob’s different
optical components at wavelengths of 806, 1310, 1550 nm using optical time domain
reflectometry (OTDR) system and results are represented as a temporal distribution
of the back-reflection levels – “reflection-map”. Also insertion losses for all Bob’s
components were measured. An OTDR system was connected to the Bob’s setup
input, and reflections from all components were measured. The polarization of the
probe light was set to maximize reflection from the fiber connector right behind the
PM. The results for the 806 and 1550 nm wavelengths are shown in the Fig. 3.2, as the
OTDR traces for 1310 and 1550 nm were found to be quite similar. The level of back
reflection ratio was around -57 dB. Thus, when Eve sends her Trojan-horse pulses
with a mean photon number of 2×106, she will get back about 4 photons on average.
As can be seen from the Fig. 3.2, attenuation and reflectance of optical interfaces
and also components depend on the wavelength. To investigate a possibility of an
attack at a other wavelengths, it would be necessary to do OTDR measurements over
the wide spectral range. Some additional spectral measurements [89] did not reveal
reflection peaks besides at 1550 nm.
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Figure 3.2: Reflections map
Reflections from all components in Clavis2 optical scheme were mapped at 806 and 1550 nm.
Reflections from several components close in time are color-coded. OTDR sensitivity was about
-83 dB at 1550 nm, and -96 dB at 806 nm. Some important reflections were obtained by
combining several measurements on part of Bob. Small filled rectangular blocks represent
FC/PC connectors with curved polished surface; PM, phase modulator; D0 and D1,
single-photon avalanche diodes; PBS-BS-C, optical assembly of polarizing BS, 50/50 BS and
circulator. OTDR model used: opto-electronics modular picosecond fiber-optic system.
(Re-printed from [89])
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Figure 3.3: Eavesdropper apparatus schematic.
(Re-printed from [89])
Eve’s apparatus, that we built to experimentally demonstrate Bob’s phase read-out,
is shown in the Fig. 3.3. Eve’s laser generated pulses with frequency of 5 MHz, syn-
chronized with Bob’s clock through a pulse delay generator (P400). The pulses were
launched to Bob’s apparatus through a fiber coupler and passed a polarization con-
troller for power optimization. Other arms of the fiber coupler lead to the homodyne
detector. One arm, control path (local oscillator (LO)), from port 4 connected to a
delay line, and the other arm is a signal path. Then, the control and the signal pulses
mix at the beam splitter (BS) of the homodyne detector. The power of the laser was
adjusted so that the mean photon number for LO was more 108 and for Eve’s pulses
to Bob was less than 1.5× 106 (about 3 back-reflected photons). The output voltage
of the homodyne detector was measured with an oscilloscope.
3.3 Results
The obtained results of homodyne detection measurement of the phase of Eve’s back-
reflected photons are shown in the Fig. 3.4. The upper trace in (a) shows Bob’s PM
voltage over 5 slots, and the lower trace shows output of the homodyne detector.
In (b) the results after integration over the time windows (shown in green) are pre-
sented, here they are obviously more distinguishable. The summary of determined
PM voltage settings over a QKD frame can be seen in the Fig. 3.5. In average, Eve
is able to determine correctly the settings of the PM in about 95% of slots.
Unfortunately for Eve, her bright pulses cause some side effects that could lead to an
increased QBER and an aborted protocol, thus Eve was not able to get any secret
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Figure 3.4: Output for Bob’s phase modulator and Eve’s homodyne detector.
(a) Upper traces present Bob’d phase modulator voltage for 5 consecutive slots and lower traces
are from Eve’s homodyne detector. Integrating over a time window (green) makes the difference
between Eve’s output pulses more evident (b). (Re-printed from [89])
Figure 3.5: Bob’s and Eve’s resulting bits.
The table shows portion of bits determined by Eve as 0E (or 1E) while Bob measured 0B (or
1B). (Re-printed from [89])
bits. Bob’s single photon detectors work in a gated mode, and despite Eve is sending
her pulses when Bob’s detectors are inactive, the detectors demonstrate increased
DCR level during many gates after Eve sent her interrogating pulse. We believe that
the bright pulses populate carrier traps in SPADs semiconductor [81, 91] which cause
the noise detection level to increase. During the next gate the trapped carriers get
released and cause avalanches - afterpulses. This increased level of DCR of SPADs,
and thus, increased QBER. When QBER increased above a certain threshold (around
8% in Clavis2), the QKD protocol will be aborted. The level of these afterpulses
depends on the brightness of Eve’s pulses.
Also, when Eve’s pulse arrives a few ns after a gate, it still can cause a click [81] in
the same slot. To avoid this, Eve should not use pulses with mean photon number
higher than 2 × 106 for Clavis2. In order to keep afterpulsing level low, Eve should
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use the dimmest-possible pulses. As she already receives only 3-4 photons per pulse,
to decrease afterpulses Eve can not attack every slot, but only some of them, thus
decreasing the average photon number. This will decrease the amount of information
she gains, but it still would compromise the security, because Eve could have some
secret bits after the privacy amplification.
To construct a working Trojan-horse attack, Eve could implement some additional
tricks. She can change the channel between Alice and Bob to a low noise channel to
minimize losses and increase a chance of detecting a photon in a given slot; or she
can block the channel completely to decrease a chance of Bob’s detection. Also Eve
can make use of a dead time after a successful detection event in Bob. Furthermore,
she can send her pulses in consecutive sets to maximize a probability of testing on a
non-zero slot, as with the low mean photon number in the protocol, most slots are
carrying zero photons; then, she would have to make a pause. To mask afterpulses
from her attack, Eve can use a substitution sequence, when she sends a sequence of
slots on the low noise channel. More detailed description of Eve strategies evaluation
can be found in [89].
In our results, with the best optimized crafted strategy, Eve’s knowledge of secret
bits never exceeded the estimate for it made by Alice and Bob. That means that
Eve’s attack failed. The main reason for the failure is that Bob’s SPADs have quite
high level of DCR and afterpulses, that contributed to QBER. Especially one of the
detectors had a high DCR. If both SPADs had same DCR as the better of the two,
Eve would have been able to gain some secret information. We modeled an optimized
attack on a system with better detector parameters (lower DCR, lower afterpulsing),
and that attack would succeed. The parameters we used for the modeling are realistic,
and next generation of SPADs used for QKD systems can match the conditions.
3.4 Conclusion
We prepared and experimentally demonstrated a Trojan-horse attack on a commer-
cial Clavis2 QKD system running SARG04 protocol [89]. We successfully demon-
strated Bob’s PM phase readout on the running system by a possible hacker. Also,
we determined limitations for launching the full Trojan-horse attack. The attack
failed mainly due to high level of afterpulses in Bob’s detectors after the bright Eve’s
pulses.
We analyzed possible Eve’s strategies to model a successful attack, and determined
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conditions for it. We note, Eve can combine the Trojan-horse attack with other
known attacks (e.g., after-gate attack [81]) for the better performance.
For one-way systems the best countermeasures against the Trojan-horse attack are
isolators and wavelength filters. For two-way system, like the one we tested, it would
be useful to decrease reflections from surfaces on the way of incoming pulses. Here
some technical recommendation we suggest:
• installing an additional detector at the entrance of Bob, randomly monitoring
incoming light level;
• reducing the time during which the PM is active;
• monitoring Bob’s SPADs output in real time, not just statistics.
Also, a possible Trojan-horse attack could be incorporated into theoretical security
proof, and a proper level of privacy amplification for neutralization the attack could
be determined.
In conclusion, the presented work led to another project investigating Trojan attack
on QKD systems at another wavelength of 1924 nm, at which Bob’s SPADs do not
respond so strongly to Eve’s bright pulses [84].
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Chapter 4
Quantum teleportation over 143 km
On the way of development of long-distance free-space quantum communication,
there were many essential steps demonstrating implementation of different quantum
protocols including quantum teleportation, Bell state measurement and entanglement
based quantum communication through longer and longer distances, see [9, 26, 27,
55, 92–95].
Our new detector demonstrates an extremely low DCR without a decreased perfor-
mance in other important parameters (detection timing jitter, detection efficiency,
afterpulsing). Implementation of such SPDs can be very beneficial for quantum com-
munications over high loss channels. Our previous generation in-lab built Si SPDs
were implemented in an experiment demonstrating successful quantum teleportation
over 143 km that was performed between two Canary Islands - La Palma and Tenerife
[33].
4.1 Challenges of the quantum teleportation field experiment
Quantum teleportation utilize a quantum channel and a classical channel between
two communicating parties, usually named Alice and Bob. Alice was located in La
Palma, and Bob in Tenerife. They share a auxiliary quantum state via the quantum
channel ∣∣Ψ−〉
23
=
1√
2
(|H〉2 |V 〉3 − |V 〉2 |H〉3) , (4.1)
where |H〉 and |V 〉 are horizontal and vertical polarization states, and photon 2 is
at Alice’s location and photon 3 is at Bob’s location. Charlie is a third member of
communication, he prepares photon 1 in state |φ〉1, using a heralded single-photon
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Figure 4.1: Experimental scheme of quantum teleportation.
Experimental scheme of quantum teleportation between the Canary Islands La Palma and
Tenerife over both quantum and classical 143-km free-space channels. (Re-printed from [33].)
Figure 4.2: Satellite photo of the sand wind from Sahara desert over Canary Islands
(Re-printed from NASA website.)
(HSP) source with a trigger photon 0 (in Fig. 4.1 photons are indicated by black
numbers on red circles). An EinsteinPodolskyRosen (EPR) source generates an en-
tangled pair of photons 2 and 3 in the state |Ψ−〉23. Alice then performs a Bell-state
measurement (BSM) on photons 1 and 2 projecting them onto two of the four Bell
states (|Ψ−〉12/|Ψ+〉12) each with the same probability 25%. Then she sends the re-
sult via the classical channel to Bob. Photon 3 is sent via the free-space quantum
channel to Bob, who applies a unitary transformation (identity operation or pi phase
shift) on photon 3 depending on the BSM result and thus turns its state |φ〉3 into a
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Figure 4.3: Detailed scheme of the teleportation setup
(Re-printed from [33].)
copy of the initial quantum state |φ〉1.
The experimental setup is shown in Fig. 4.3. A 808-nm laser located at Alice’s
location on La Palma iceland at the Jacobus Kapteyn Telescope of the Isaac Newton
Group, was emitting femtosecond pulses with frequency of 80 MHz. Then, those
pulses were up-converted to 404-nm pulses used for spontaneous parametric down
conversion (SPDC) to generate two pairs of entangled photon in two nonlinear BBO
crystals. One crystal was producing photons 2 and 3 in the state |Ψ−〉23. The second
SPDC source was producing photons 0 and 1. Photon 0 was registered by an APD
and served as a trigger, and the photon 1 for teleportation by Charlie, who randomly
chooses polarization for it using half- and quarter-wave plates. For BSM, photons 1
and 2 were overlapped in a fiber beam splitter (FBS) and then their polarization was
analyzed. Our BSM setup was able to identify two out of four Bell states, because of
the linear optics only implemented [96]. While the BSM was performed on photons 1
and 2, the photon 3 was being sent to Bob over 143 km free space quantum channel.
Bob’s apparatus were located on Tenerife island at the Optical Ground Station of the
European Space Agency. Our experiment had two stages. At the first stage, only the
cases of the state |Ψ−〉12 were considered. In these cases, the photon 3 sent to Bob,
was already in the same state as photon 3, so identity operator had to be applied
at Bob’s location. To check the successful teleportation, a polarization analyzer was
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used. It consisted of a quarter and half-wave plates, polarization beam splitter and
two Si-APDs.
At the second stage of the experiment, a real-time feed-forward operation was imple-
mented. After Alice performed the BSM, she sent the result via classical channel to
Bob. Then Bob applied a pi phase shift or identity operator to photon 3 and obtains
an initial state |φ〉1.
During the experiment, the quantum channel losses varied from 28.1 dB to 39.0 dB,
that was mainly caused by fast temperature changes and strong wind. It resulted
in significant challenges for the teleportation experiment. First, it was an extremely
low signal-to-noise ratio. Second, long data collection time, also because of very
low signal level. To overcome those problems several advanced techniques were
used: a frequency-uncorrelated polarization-entangled photon pairs source [97–99],
entanglement-assisted clock synchronization [93, 100, 101] and ultra-low-noise SPDs
with large active area at Bob’s side [77].
4.2 Numerical simulation of the teleportation experiment de-
pending on DCR of SPDs
To estimate quantitatively the importance of ultra-low-noise SPDs on Bob’s side in
the teleportation experiment, Xiasong Ma from Vienna team performed a numerical
simulation based on an analytical model shown in the Ref. [102].
The probability of successful teleportation is given as the product of a successful Bell
state measurement in Alice, pBSM, and the link efficiency from Alice to Bob η [102].
The corresponding probability to record an error due to noise at Alice location is
pBSM ·D · τ , where D is DCR of Alice SPDs, and τ is the coincidence time window.
Thus the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is given by
SNR = η/(Dτ). (4.2)
From this follows that reducing D can increase SNR. This is essential for Bob’s
measurement apparatus because of the low quantum signal after the optical free-
space link. In Fig. 4.4 we show the teleportation visibility depending on the link
attenuation for two different DCR of Bob’s detectors. These simulations are based
on following parameters of spontaneous parametric down conversion (SPDC) source:
count rate of entangled photon source 90000 cps, count rate of non-entangled photon
36
Link attenuation (dB)
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0
0
30000
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
0.6
0.7
0.8
0 10 20 30 40 6050
Link attenuation (dB)
0 10 20 30 40 6050
Te
le
po
rta
tio
n 
vi
si
bi
lit
y
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Te
le
po
rta
tio
n 
vi
si
bi
lit
y
M
ea
su
re
m
en
t t
im
e 
of
 o
ne
 d
at
a 
po
in
t (
s)
30000
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
M
ea
su
re
m
en
t t
im
e 
of
 o
ne
 d
at
a 
po
in
t (
s)
DCR = 600 cps (a)
(b)
DCR = 50 cps 
Figure 4.4: Simulation results for the experiment performance
a) with DCR of 600 cps previously, and b) DCR of 50 cps with our detector system. (Re-printed
from private communication with X. Ma)
source 110000 cps, expected 4-fold count rate at 30 dB attenuation 0.07 cps, local
entanglement visibility 91%, coincidence window 1 ns.
Figure 4.4 (a) shows expected visibility and data collection time with SPD with
DCR of 600 cps. The teleportation seems feasible up to a link attenuation of around
35 dB with a measurement time of approximately 4 h per data point. Figure 4.4
(b) is for SPDs with DCR of 50 cps: the visibility clearly makes a difference at
attenuation higher that 30 dB, which results in almost halved data collection time.
In the simulation in Fig. 4.4, the detection rate stays the same for the illustrated
point (35 dB). Note that the lower DCR reduces the measurement time, because the
observable visibility will be higher.
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4.3 Detectors for the experiment
Our SPDs used in the experiment had a low DCR of about 15–20 cps, and the big
sensitive area of 0.5 mm [33, 77]. That allowed to reach a decent detection rate in the
experiment, and therefore a manageable measurement time. A good weather condi-
tion on the day of the experiment (actual date) provided a clear atmosphere. However
for an experiment planned and facilities booked months in advance, a weather con-
ditions could prevent the experiment run. Frequent winds from Sahara desert over
Atlantic carry sand and dust, and severely decrease transparency of atmosphere in
the area of the experiment. Thus, the photon detection rate would drop and measure-
ment time would increase enormously. See picture with an example of Sahara sand
wind in the Fig. 4.2. Initially, the quantum teleportation experiment was planned on
the summer 2011 and the facilities were booked. But because of a severe pollution
the sand wind from Sahara desert the visibility of the free-space optical channel was
so low that the whole experiment had to be postponed.
SPDs used in the experiment were replicas of in-lab-built SPDs described in the
paper [77]. It was Si-APD based SPDs cooled down with 3 stage TEC (Fig. 4.5),
with passive quenching circuit. For the experiment we built 3 SPDs, Fig. 4.5, two
were used in the experiment, and one was a spare one. We conducted first DCR
measurements. Complete characterization of SPDs was done in-situ at Tenerife.
Their parameters during the experiment were the following:
• DCR of 15 cps for each unit (one SPD was set at −65.5 ◦C and second one at
−64.9 ◦C),
• efficiency of 50% (at 8 V above threshold, it was a trade of between higher
efficiency at higher bias voltage and lower DCR at lower bias voltage),
• afterpulsing probability of 0.15%,
• saturation count rate of 400 kHz
Water chiller was running at +18 ◦C, comparator threshold was set at 85 mV for
both SPDs.
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Figure 4.5: SPD, open view.
(photo c○Vadim Makarov)
4.4 Results and conclusion
The detailed results of the experiment can be seen in [33].
For the first stage of the experiment tomographic measurements were performed
during three nights, in total accumulating data during 6.5 h. The fidelity of the
teleported states is defined as f = 〈φideal| ρ |φideal〉, where φideal ∈ {|H〉 , |V 〉 , (|H〉+
|V 〉)/√2, (|H〉 − i |V 〉)/√2, and |φ〉1 was approximately one of the four ideal states.
The average fidelity was measured f = 0.863± 0.038, that exceed the classical limit
of 2/3.
At the second stage of the experiment we implemented the feed-forward of the BSM
results from Alice to Bob in real time over 143 km free-space channel. The input states
were |P 〉 = (|H〉 + |V 〉)/√2 and |R〉 = (|H〉 + i |V 〉)/√2. Those states are chosen
from different mutually unbiased bases to confirm the generality of the procedure. On
Bob’s side the arrived photon 3 state was analyzed in the eigenbasis of the input state
(|P 〉 / |M〉 or |R〉 / |L〉 for the input state |P 〉 or |R〉), where |M〉 = (|H〉 − |V 〉)/√2
and |L〉 = (|H〉 − i |V 〉)/√2. The resulting fidelities for states |P 〉 or |R〉 were
0.760± 0.050 and 0.800± 0.037, higher than classical limit of 2/3.
The presented experiment clearly proves the feasibility of quantum teleportation
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through a long-distance free-space channel. As the experiment successfully demon-
strated teleportation through a high loss channel, it points to a feasibility of a ground
- low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellite teleportation. The attenuation of the used optical
link is higher than an attenuation of the ground-to-LEO satellite link, because the
path in Earth atmosphere that presents most losses, is shorter than distance between
La Palma and Tenerife.
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Chapter 5
Improved SPDs afterpulsing analysis
method
For afterpulses analysis we developed a new calculation method, adapted especially
for long-time afterpulses, which appear in APDs at low temperatures and feature high
probabilities and longer lifetimes of traps. In contradiction to previously described
methods [103–106], we analyze time intervals of APD’s outcoming pulses not only
between two subsequent pulses, but all mutual time intervals during 1 s (a chosen
time, much longer then the longest afterpulse lifetime). Our way of calculation allows
to determine afterpulses with lifetimes longer than time between neighboring pulses.
Furthermore, it reveals a ’true’ dark count level excluding afterpulses. Our method
of afterpulse analysis can be implemented for other APDs as well.
A common way to calculate afterpulsing probability is to analyze time intervals be-
tween neighboring counts [103–106]. Then the statistical distribution of time intervals
is being computed and histogrammed. This method works reasonable well for short
afterpulsing times and large quantities of detection data. However the method fails,
when these conditions are not met. We give an example of this afterpulsing anal-
ysis from our Si APD at −100 ◦C. Due to very low DCR at this low temperature
the data acquisition took 5.5 days of continuous recording. Fig. 5.1 illustrates the
method of analysis and Fig. 5.2 presents two resulting histograms (a, b), obtained by
distribution of the analyzed time intervals on equally sized bins. The first histogram
was built using smaller bins of 228 ns and provides sufficient temporal resolution for
the peak of the histogram representing afterpulses to appear. However, small bins
does not filter out statistical fluctuations in the tail of the histogram on the right
representing dark counts. The second histogram in the Fig. 5.2 was built using larger
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1- a count at the output of APD
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Time
Δt1
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Δt10
Δt9
Figure 5.1: Scheme for common afterpulsing analysis
The method considers only time intervals between adjacent counts.
bins of 0.03 s, and the tail of the histogram is now represented well, demonstrating
exponential decay caused by Poisson distribution of dark counts. However, 0.03 s is
larger than the afterpulsing time, and the peak of the histogram is no longer clearly
visible. From both these histograms the detector dead-time can be determined to be
about 0.5µs.
We developed an improved afterpulsing processing with a dramatic advantage, that
allows to calculate correctly long-time afterpulses. The main features of our analysis
are including in analysis all time intervals between counts during a certain time longer
than the longest trap life time, and use of histogram with exponentially increasing
bin size.
To calculate afterpulsing we analyze time intervals between a detection count (#1
in Fig. 5.3(a)) and the all subsequent counts (##2..7) during a certain time, up to
l =1 s in the presented example. The processing length l should be chosen to exceed
the longest possible afterpulsing time. The resulting time intervals ∆t1−1..∆t1−6 are
histogrammed. The procedure is then repeated starting from the next count #2
(with resulting time differences ∆t2−1..∆t2−7), and then starting from the next count
#3 and so on until the end of the data is reached.
The resulting histogram shown in Fig. 5.3 (b) is built on 128 bins, exponentially
increasing by a factor of 1.2, starting from 78.125 ps. This allows to have higher
resolution of the the histogram for short times, and lower resolution for long times.
For this histogram time intervals during 10 second after each count were analyzed.
This histogram features an almost noiseless tail towards long time scales and quite
smooth curve of the peak for short time scales close to zero. From the histogram
we can estimate the DCR, afterpulsing probability, APD’s dead time and recharge
time. The dead time starts after an avalanche (at time=0), and lasts until the next
counts appear (about 0.5µs). The recharge time is determined as a time after the
avalanche quenched that is necessary for restoring voltage across the diode. It starts
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Figure 5.2: Resulting histograms for common way of afterpulsing analysis
Histograms built with 228 ns bins (a) and 0.03 s bins (b). The histogram (a) has a higher
resolution which makes afterpulsing peak visible, but also makes the “tail” of the histogram
noisy. Histogram (b) has a lower resolution, that does not show the afterpulsing peak, but
shows the declining “tail” resulting from the Poisson distribution of dark counts. Data size is
114109 counts. The dark counts were obtained from C30902SH APD at −100 ◦C, at 14 V over
breakdown.
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Figure 5.3: Improved long-time afterpulsing analysis
Analysis scheme (a) and resulting histogram (b) with exponentially increasing bins. This
histogram uses the same data as Fig. 5.2 (114109 counts, C30902SH APD at −100 ◦C, at 14 V
overvoltage.) The afterpulsing peak of the histogram has the higher resolution which allows to
see its features, e.g. step-wise structure in this example. The “tail” of the histogram does not
decline here because in this analysis it does not reflect the Poisson distribution of the dark
counts but shows the averaged level of dark counts.
44
from the end of the dead time until about the peak value of the count rate (about
0.3µs). The plot levels off on the right to the DCR. The afterpulsing probability is
calculated as the area of the histogram above DCR level.
Life time constants of trapped carriers can be found by fitting the decaying slope of
the peak [107] a sum of exponents:
P (t) = D + A1 · e−t/τ1 + A2 · e−t/τ2 + ..., (5.1)
where P (t) is a carrier emission probability, D is DCR due to thermally generated
carriers, A1, A2, ... are amplitudes of the different exponential components. Our
software implemented fitting for up to four exponential components. Only lifetimes
longer than the detector dead time (about 0.8µs) for our passive quenching circuit
can be determined; also, this fitting procedure applicable only when the secondary
afterpulses (afterpulses caused by afterpulses) are negligible. For Si-SPADs that we
used our method for, afterpulses are less than 1%, then second order afterpulses are
insignificant.
We implemented a Python code for analyzing afterpulsing and calculate the trap’s
life times, see Appendix A.
Summarizing, we have developed a new advanced method of analysis for long time
afterpulses, allowing calculating afterpulsing probability including secondary after-
pulses and higher orders of afterpulses. Our algorithm was developed for dark count
analysis, but with minor adjustments it was implemented for analysis of data col-
lected from an APD illuminated with weak periodic light pulses [108].
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Chapter 6
Building a super low noise SPD
6.1 Motivation
A necessity of a secure communications, that will be able to withstand hacking at-
tacks from quantum computers, leads to fast development of quantum cryptography
[7, 11, 109–112]. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is now the most commercialized
area of quantum communications. There are several companies (e.g., ID Quantique
(Switzerland)) on the market selling QKD systems, which are ready for use by cus-
tomers with high-demand of security, e.g., banking, medicine or government and
military. A very important direction for the development of QKD is its expansion
to global scale and the creation of world-wide QKD network [31, 56, 113–115]. A
lot of work has already been done to reach the longest distances over the ground for
free-space quantum communications, e.g., [33, 93, 116, 117].
The main challenge of the long-distance free-space quantum communication is the
high photon losses in the channel, caused mostly by absorption, diffraction and tur-
bulence in the air [56, 118]. To minimize absorption losses, while still using very well
performing Silicon simple photon detectors, a wavelength around a low-loss window
at around 800 nm is often chosen. Diffraction losses can be minimized only by in-
creasing sizes of sending and receiving telescopes, however the atmospheric turbulence
puts a limit on this improvement. Turbulence losses are unpredictable and depend
on weather conditions. Other photon losses happen in sending and receiving appa-
ratus, and single-photon detectors are essential part of it. The suitable detectors for
long-distance free-space quantum communications must demonstrate high detection
efficiency, low detection timing jitter, low dark count rate (DCR) and low afterpulsing
probability. E.g., targeted parameters for a potential SPDs for a quantum satellite
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were the following: DCR below 200 cps, quantum detection efficiency at least 45%,
timing jitter about 250 ps, afterpulsing below 1% for 500 ns. From a number of po-
tential candidates, silicon avalanche photodiodes (APDs) and photomultiplier tubes
(PMTs) are the most suitable. However PMTs have lower detection efficiency at the
required 800 nm, whereas APDs have a long history of use in quantum communi-
cations thanks to their advantages: larger photosensitive area of 500µm, low DCR
(typical 100 cps), high detection efficiency, compact package, low timing-jitter of 0.5
ns FWHM, and low cost. Low DCR and high detection efficiency are crucial for
performance of quantum free-space ground-to-ground communications. Cooling of
APDs can be used to decrease DCR [77].
While cooling causes increase of afterpulsing, it can be a useful tool for implementing
APD-based SPDs for satellite-based quantum communications [119, 120].
We have built and tested a Si-APD detector, demonstrating very good parameters,
suitable for long-distance free-space quantum communication experiments. We can
compare performance of our new detector with the most advanced commercially
available models, e.g., ID Quantique ID100VIS and ID120VIS [121, 122]. ID100VIS
demonstrates outstanding performance, and the similar level of DCR as our home-
built detector, however it has 100 times smaller sensitive area, and lower detection
efficiency (maximum 35% at 500 nm). ID120VIS has the same size of sensitive area
as our SPD, and demonstrates a high detection efficiency, but its DCR is 200 cps,
through DCR of our SPD is a few cps. We built our SPD using of-the-shelf APD
(Excelitas, C30902SH) with 500µm diameter photosensitive area. Our new detector
has a compact package (see Fig. 6.1 a and b), and is able to cool down an APD down
to −100 ◦C, utilizing a 5-stage thermoelectric cooler. Due to that low cooling our
detector demonstrated very low DCR, down to few cps. The detector package was
vacuumed, to improve thermal insulation and prevent condensation. We measured
dark count rate, photon detection efficiency, jitter and afterpulsing as functions of
temperature and APD bias voltage.
For afterpulses analysis we developed a new calculation method, elaborated especially
for long time afterpulses, which appear in APDs at low temperatures and feature high
probabilities and longer lifetimes of traps. It represented in Chapter 5.
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6.2 Detectors design
6.2.1 Mechanical and thermal design
Our present detector model is an improved version of the previous home-built SPD
[77], which was able to cool down to around −65 to −80 ◦C, and demonstrated DCR
of about 20 cps, which made it possible to use them in a long-distance free-space
experiment [33]. In our present work we attempted to create an APD based SPD
able to cool down below −100 ◦C in a relatively compact and low cost package, and
investigate behavior of APDs at such low temperatures.
The photo of the detector is represented in the Fig. 6.1. Aluminum box is closed
tightly with a lid sealed with a rubber O-ring, and a vacuum lubricant is used for
better insulation. A five-stage TEC (Osterm PE5-195-1420-2040) was used to cool
down an APD placed in a holder on the top of TEC. The holder is made of Kovar to
prevent destruction caused by difference in thermal expansion coefficients between
TEC ceramics and the holder material. To achieve temperatures as low as about
−100 ◦C the package is under vacuum to prevent convection between cold and hot
side of the TEC stages and with the outside walls. The vacuum also prevents con-
densation. A vacuum turbo pump was constantly active during the SPD operation,
providing a vacuum level of 10−5 Torr. We noticed that 10−3 Torr already reduces
convection sufficient to reach the thermal performance at maximum vaccum level
within 1 ◦C. The temperature of the APD is measured by a platinum sensor RTD-
100, epoxied in the holder base, and connected via 4-wire scheme to eliminate errors
caused by wire lengths differences. All electrical connections to the cold plate were
soldered via 50µm diameter annealed Pt wires, to reduce heat conduction. The hot
side of the TEC was cooled down with +14 ◦C water, provided by ThermoTek T255P
closed-loop chiller. Temperature controller for the TEC was custom made in our lab,
but instruments with similar parameters are available commercially. At the lowest
achieved temperature of −104 ◦C the TEC, at the ambient temperature of about
+20 ◦C, was running at its highest settings of 13 V and 3 A, consuming 39 W of
electrical power.
6.2.2 Electronics
Our new electronics design is based on the previous version, used in Ref. [77]. In
our new electronics schematic we attempted to minimize timing jitter, used a faster
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a)
b)
Figure 6.1: Photo of the detector.
a) The main metal container houses the detector which is under vacuum. A metal shield
normally covers the electronic board, but was removed for the photo. b) The detector package
is open. An APD is mounted in the holder on the top of the TEC. A thermal paste is applied to
improve cooling of the APD. The APD and thermal sensor are connected by Platinum wires to
the fee-through pins. The quench resistor is soldered directly to the fee-through pin. A Schottky
diode is inserted in the TEC line to prevent a damage from an occasional switched polarity.
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comparator ADCMP581 with variable threshold voltage. Also, in the new scheme
we located TEC controller and signal detection and processing circuits on different
boards in order to avoid electrical cross-talk interference, that we observed sometimes
with our previous scheme. The electronics schematic is shown in the Figure 7.4 and
electronics board shown in the Figure 6.3. As in the previous scheme, we implemented
a simple but reliable passive quenching scheme with quenching resistance of 403 kΩ.
It’s core part is similar to one described in Ref. [74] as a passive quenching circuit with
current-mode output. Its maximum detection rate of 0.2–0.4 Mcps is lower compared
to active quenching circuits, but sufficient for applications with low signal rate, e.g.,
long distance free-space quantum communications that require very low dark counts
level. The long dead time (>1 µs) is not a problem for the low-signal-rate application,
and furthermore, it suppresses afterpulses. All measurement results presented in this
paper were done with the optimum threshold setting for our comparator at 150 mV.
The detection scheme has transistor-transistor logic (TTL) and nuclear instrumental
mode (NIM) outputs.
A 0− 500 V high voltage bias supply (EMCO CA05P) was used in our scheme. We
implemented a possibility of remote diagnostic and control of the detector parameters,
for future use of the SPD in various experiments.
In the Fig. 6.1 a metal shield is removed to show the electronic board. However the
detector cannot be used without a proper shielding because of interference with outer
sources, e.g., mobile phones.
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Figure 6.2: Detector electronics scheme
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Figure 6.3: Detector electronics board layout
6.3 SPD characterization procedure
For characterization of our detector we used a scheme shown in the Figure 6.4.
First, the APD’s breakdown voltage was determined, then DCR was measured with
a detector lid on and the laser off. Then, the detection jitter, detection efficiency and
afterpulsing probability were measured.
Breakdown voltage was determined by extrapolation method [123]. Bias voltage
of an APD was initially set to approximately 20− 30 V above breakdown, and grad-
ually decreased. Then corresponding avalanche amplitudes were recorded for each
bias voltage. About 10 points were measured until the bias voltage was very close to
the breakdown. The results were plotted on a chart of avalanche amplitude vs. bias
voltage. Then, the breakdown voltage was determined as an intersection point of an
extrapolated linear part of the resulting function with the bias voltage axes. This
method allows to determine breakdown voltage with better than ±0.5 V precision.
Dark count rate. False counts produced by an APD in absence of light are called
dark counts and caused by intrinsic processes in APD [74, 91, 124]. The largest
contribution for dark counts is caused by thermal excitation, when a thermally ex-
cited carrier triggers an avalanche. Those dark counts decrease exponentially with
temperature [77], about 50% every 8 degrees. Another effect contributing to the
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DCR are tunneling and afterpulsing [74, 91, 124]. Another a minor contribution can
come from blackbody radiation, when photons from the detector package are getting
detected.
In order to ensure complete blocking of surrounding photons during the DCR mea-
surements, our detector was kept with its lid on, and the room lights were turned
off. The photon counts were averaged over 100 s using a counter (Stanford Research
Systems SR620) to minimize uncertainty due to counting statistics.
We estimated the expected contribution to the DCR caused by blackbody radiation
from the detector lid located about 10 mm from APD’s sensitive area and kept at
room temperature of 293 K. The thermal energy radiated by a blackbody radiator
per second per unit area is given by the Stefan-Boltzmann Law:
P
A
= σT 4[j/m2s], (6.1)
where P is the radiated power, A is radiating area and σ is Stefan-Boltzmann constant
and equals to 5.67 · 10−8 Wm−2K−4. The spectral range of our APD is 400..900 nm
and the area of the lid contributing into the blackbody radiation is A = pid2/4 =
19.6 · 10−8 m2. Distribution of the radiated power over wavelength range is given by
Planck radiation formula:
〈E〉 = hν
ehν/kT − 1 (6.2)
Finding the power radiated within a given wavelength range requires integration
over the range. Using an online calculator utilizing the numerical approximation
[125], the power radiated in the 400..900 nm interval equals to P = 0.377 · 10−23 W.
To estimate the upper bound for the number of the radiated photons, we assume
that all emitted photons are at 900 nm, then hν = 1.38eV = 1.602 · 10−19Ws. Then,
number of photons Nph = P/hν = 0.377 · 10−23W/1.602 · 10−19Ws = 0.235 · 10−4/s =
0.085/hour. Thus, the area of the lid of the same size as APD’s photosensitive area
contributes negligibly, less than 1 photon per hour.
Detection efficiency was measured using a 808 nm pulsed laser (Figure 6.4) pulsing
at the repetition frequency of 30 kHz, then the laser pulses were attenuated down to
a well characterized optical power of 0.0139 pW, which corresponds to 56500 photons
per second, using neutral density filters and digital attenuators calibrated at 808 nm.
Detection efficiency was calculated as a ratio of detected Ndet to expected Nsent
photons:
η =
Ndet −DCR
Nsent
, (6.3)
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Figure 6.4: Characterization scheme
For DCR and detection efficiency measurements the output of the SPD is connected to the
counter. For afterpulsing analysis the SPD output is connected to a time stamp unit (time
tagger (TT)). For breakdown voltage and timing jitter measurements the SPD is connected to
the oscilloscope. Two axis translation stage allows to scan photosensitive area of the SPD.
where Nsent is determined as
Nsent =
Pλ
hc
, (6.4)
where P is power of the laser measured by a power meter before calibrated attenuators
and calculated to the detector point, λ is wavelength, h is Planck’s constant, and c
is the speed of light. Measurement error of this type of measurement is significant
[77], and estimated to be ±10%.
Afterpulsing probability was calculated from recorded 106 dark counts using
TT, with resolution 128 ps. Then the obtained data were processed according to our
method described in Chapter 5. The longest necessary data acquisition time was
5.5 days at −100 ◦C.
Detection timing jitter was measured using an oscilloscope (4 GHz bandwidth
LeCroy 640Zi) in a histogram mode. Bright laser pulses from 808 nm laser (see
Fig. 6.4) were divided into two arms; one connected through a linear photodetector
to the oscilloscope and the second part of the beam attenuated below single photon
level and focused to 25µm spot at the SPD photosensitive area. The APD’s avalanche
signals were connected to another oscilloscope’s input. Then we built a histogram
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of time delays between the laser pulses and the SPD output over 106 samples, and
determine timing jitter of the SPD as a full width at half maximum (FWHM) of
histogram. An example of the resulting histograms is shown in insets in the Fig. 6.6.
Using two axis translation stage we tested dependance of timing jitter on the position
of the focused beam at the APD’s sensitive area.
6.4 Results
A sample APD C30902SH (Excelitas) was cooled down and fully characterized at
several temperatures over the range of −100 ◦C to 0 ◦C range, biased at 14 V above
its breakdown voltage. DCR was measured at 7, 14, 28 and 40 V above breakdown
voltage in temperature range from −104 to −30 ◦C. The timing jitter of APD was
measured at −60 to −30 ◦C and at several bias voltages.
The breakdown voltage [Fig. 6.5(a)] increases with temperature about linearly with
a coefficient 0.8 V◦C−1. This is a typical behavior of Si APDs [126], which as we show
here extends down to −104 ◦C.
The DCR as a function of temperature is shown in Fig. 6.5(b). The lowest achieved
DCR of 0.3±0.05 counts per second (cps) was observed for the APD biased 14 V and
cooled down to −100 ◦C. There was a discrepancy between DCR measurements done
at different times. The four curves in Fig. 6.5(b) with dots were measured at one
time, and the curve with diamonds for 14 V over breakdown voltage, was measured
several months later during collecting data for afterpulsing analysis. Down to −70 ◦C
the curves match perfectly, but then one curve levels off whereas the other continues
linearly. It could be due to a poor black-out. Another possible explanation could be
a “memory effect”: after a strong illumination an APD has a higher DCR for a long
time up to 24 hours [127, 128].
To verify experimentally the contribution of black body radiation to our DCR mea-
surement, we performed DCR measurement with the detector lid cooled down below
zero, and compared it with measurement when the lid was at room temperature. No
notable change in DCR was registered.
Detection efficiency varies in the range 48 to 53 % (Fig. 6.5(c), decreasing slightly at
higher temperatures, likely because of higher DCR.
We measured the detection timing jitter of C30902SH depending on its bias voltage,
temperature, comparator level and position of the beam at the photosensitive area.
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Figure 6.5: Detector characteristics
(a) APD breakdown voltage, (b) DCR, (c) detection efficiency, (d) afterpulsing probability of
C30902SH. The latter two were measured at 14 V over breakdown voltage.
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Figure 6.6: Detection timing jitter
Detection timing jitter as a function of bias voltage was measured for C30902SH at three
different temperatures: −30, −50, −60 ◦C. As applied voltage increases, the jitter decreases, see
an example of two histograms in the inset, measured on 105 samples at the following conditions:
−50 ◦C, comparator threshold set at 100 mV, bias voltage 7 and 20 V above breakdown. The
timing jitter values were measured at FWHM (full width at half-maximum) is 1220 and 640 ps.
Timing jitter decreases with rise of APD’s bias voltage in the same way for all three
measured temperatures, see Fig. 6.6. This happens due to increase of avalanche
propagation speed [71–74, 123, 129, 130]. Examples of jitter distribution at two
different bias voltages are shown in inset in Fig. 6.6.
Also we have checked timing jitter dependence on position of an incident light at
the sensitive area of the APD. As expected [124, 131], the time of an avalanche
propagation in the detector area depends on the position of the initial seed. The
measurement was done at −50 ◦C, at five different bias voltages, same as in Fig. 6.6.
The beam was focused to the spot of 25µm in diameter. The results demonstrate
notably lower jitter at the center with up to 250 ps difference comparing to the
edge’s measurements. Distance between center and the edge was 25µm. The data
represented in Fig. 6.6 were measured with the beam focused at the center of APD’s
sensitive area.
Decrease of the comparator threshold voltage in the avalanche registration scheme
leads to a decrease of timing jitter. Stronger avalanches progress faster and have
higher coefficient for their rising slopes, therefore they cross the comparator’s thresh-
old earlier, and will be registered first. Smaller avalanches have less steep rising
slop and will hit the comparator threshold level with some delay comparing to big
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avalanches. To minimize this time delay, it is beneficial to lower the comparator
threshold voltage. However, the lowest practical limit for this comparator level by
line noises and cross talks was 23 mV.
We calculated afterpulsing probability for C30902SH APD using our method de-
scribed in the previous chapter. The resulting temperature dependence is shown in
Fig. 6.5(d). Afterpulsing notably increases with cooling, because the life time of
carrier traps increases, but does not exceed 1% at the lowest tested temperature of
−100 ◦C.
Results of our attempted calculation of trap lifetimes are presented in Table 6.1. The
decay slope at −20 ◦C was approximated with one exponent, at −40 and −60 ◦C
with three exponents, at −80 and −100 ◦C with four exponents. The estimated trap
lifetimes are between 1.37µs and 482µs. The fitting starts from the bin next after
the maximum bin. Using the fitting with a sum of exponents, we reach a good fitting
for curves from −20 ◦C to −80 ◦C, whereas for −100 ◦C, where we used a sum of
five exponents, fitting is not so perfect, but possibly it could do better with more
exponents. The data at −100 ◦C is also somewhat noisy, owing to the very low DCR
and limited time of measurement (only 5.5 days).
Unfortunately we only had time to fully characterize our detector with only one
sample of Si APD (Excelitas C30902SH). Another sample of the Excelitas, C30902SH
was tested for DCR at temperatures down to −90 ◦C and demonstrated the similar
level of DCR (0.58 cps at −91 ◦C).
We remark that the methodology introduced in this Article was also used to char-
acterize many more APD samples exposed to space radiation, as described in the
Chapter 8. That testing included multiple samples of three different Si-APD models:
Excelitas C30921SH and SLiK, and Laser Components SAP500S2. The afterpulse
characterization methodology has also been further refined in Ref. [108], periodic
weak laser pulses were applied to the APD at repetition rate 1/l. This increases the
count rate without affecting the afterpulse distribution, and allows to collect data
faster at low temperatures.
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Table 6.1: Time constants with their amplitudes and corresponding afterpulsing histograms
at six temperatures. D denotes thermally generated (constant) dark count level. The fit
given by τi, Ai is plotted as solid lines.
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6.5 Discussion and conclusion
We built and characterized a custom compact SPD based on a Si-APD which has
very low noise, due to cooling of −100 ◦C. All main parameters of our SPD are in a
good range for use in long distance quantum communication experiments: the DCR
below 1 cps, afterpulsing at the lowest temperature does not exceed 0.5%, detec-
tion efficiency about 50%, detection timing jitter changes between 500 and 1050 ps,
depending on bias voltage of the APD. Using SPDs with such parameters could
be beneficial for experiments of quantum communications over high-loss channels.
Afterpulses can be further reduced by discarding in post-processing, depending on
application requirements.
To determine afterpulsing probability, we have developed a new advanced method of
analysis of afterpulses over a large time-scale of 1 second. This method allows calcu-
lating afterpulses probability including secondary afterpulses (caused by afterpulses)
and higher orders of afterpulses, and easily determining a level of dark counts without
afterpulses contribution. Our algorithm can be adapted with minor adjustments for
analysis of data collected from an APD illuminated with weak periodic light pulses
[108]. Furthermore, we implemented a curve fitting procedure to our data to calculate
lifetime constants for carrier traps, and their corresponding amplitudes.
The results of the present research have been used for planning detector design for
a future space mission [132] and for finding a way of mitigating radiation damage in
APDs [108, 120].
A possible next step is to collect higher number of data points at −100 ◦C and resolve
the shape of the afterpulsing probability decay at that temperature. Possibly, it will
provide additional information about lifetimes of traps. The afterpulsing analysis
algorithm can be improved to minimize dependence on bin size parameters, and
optimize calculation process. Also, it would be interesting to test our new detector
with APDs from other manufactures, e.g., Laser Components.
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Chapter 7
Detector prototype for Airborne
demonstration of QKD receiver payload
7.1 Experiment motivation and description
To extend distances for quantum communications, including QKD, up to global scale,
satellite based quantum stations need to be developed. We built an SPD prototype
of the receiver payload as a form-fit-function model of a satellite suitable system,
which was part of the payload prototype used for an airborne demonstration of QKD
[132], where QKD was established between a transmitting stationary ground station
and a quantum receiver placed on board of a flying airplane. The successful demon-
stration of QKD over 3-10 km distance was an important step towards implementing
a satellite-ground QKD.
Commercially available APDs did not fulfill special requirements for the nano satellite
QKD receiver. The QKD receiver prototype was custom built according to require-
ments for space qualified satellite payload. Many components used in the detector
prototype are of space grade, and other easily replaced by their close models with
space grade. Requirements on satellite receiver payload for thermal, vacuum and
power management were elaborated and implemented.
The QKD source was a high speed polarization source based on described in Ref. [99]
and implementing BB84 protocol with decoy states ([17, 114]). The source created
weak coherent pulses at 785 nm. Signal and decoy levels were generated with electro-
optical intensity modulator. Mean photon numbers for outgoing pulses were µ ≈ 0.5
and ν ≈ 0.1 for signal and decoy pulses.
63
Figure 7.1: Schematic diagram of the receiver apparatus
Acronyms are as follows: F, band-pass filters; FSM, fast-steering mirror; QS, quad cell
photosensor; FPC, fine pointing controller; IOA, integrated optical assembly (developed by
INO); DM, detector module; FPU, fine-pointing unit; WB, wide-field beacon (produced by the
IRL); CDPU, control and data processing unit . Other acronyms and details given in the text.
The red border indicates components that are mounted on the motors. (Re-printed from [132].)
Four polarizations for BB84 protocol (vertical, horizontal, diagonal and anti-diagonal)
were created using two electro-optical phase modulators in a balanced Mach-Zehnder
interferometer. The intensity and polarization were randomized over 1000 pulse se-
quence. Though its insecurity for real QKD implementation, it was sufficient for our
demonstration experiment. The quantum signals were transmitted trough a 12-cm
aperture refractive telescope.
In the experiment we used fine- and coarse-pointing systems ([133, 134]) at a wave-
length of 850 nm to set up and maintain a link between ground and the moving
aircraft.
In the Fig. 7.1 a scheme for the receiver apparatus shown. The 10-cm aperture re-
fractive telescope collects the quantum and beakon signals. First signals go through
a fine-pointing unit (FPU), that was developed by commercial companies (Institute
National d’Optique (INO) and Neptec Design Group). The FPU separates quan-
tum and beakon signals, directing the beakon signal to the fine-pointing apparatus,
providing position feedback, and the quantum signal to a spatial-mode filter (50µm
pinhole) and two spectral filters of 785 nm wavelength. Then the quantum signal
passes through polarization analyzer contained in the integrated optical assembly
(IOA). Four outputs of the IOA corresponding to four polarization states (V, H, D,
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A) coupled to fibers connected to four SPDs inside the detector module (DM). De-
tection signals from SPDs were time tagged with resolution of 78 ps. The rest of the
receiver-side QKD protocol was executed in the CDPU using the Linux operating
system, implementing data storage, communication and processing operations.
7.2 1-channel prototype SPD
At the first stage of our project, we designed, built and characterized 1-channel Si-
APD based SPD. In the Fig. 7.2 it is shown mounted on a characterization setup.
For the 1-channel prototype we used Excelitas SLiK APD, window type.
The bracket (Fig. 7.3) was machined of aluminum alloy, anodized and served to hold
the SLiK Si-APD and electronics board, and dissipate heat from the SLiK’s in-built
TEC. Electronic scheme for the prototype developed at IQC is shown in Fig. 7.4. It
is a passive quenching scheme, featuring a possibility for a remote control via CPU.
Bias voltage and temperature (thermistor reading) of the APD, voltage and current
of TEC and comparator threshold were controlled. Time tagging was realized on
FPGA.
This first 1-channel prototype was tested for breakdown voltage, DCR and efficiency
at temperatures between +20 and −20 ◦C) and at several different bias voltages. De-
tection timing jitter was measured only at −20 ◦C, because that temperature looked
the most suitable for our prospective use of the SPD, providing DCR below 200 cps.
The characterization setup and procedure were similar to those used for characteri-
zation of Low temperature super low-noise in-lab built SPD (Ch. 4). Results of the
characterization can be seen in the Figs. 7.5 and 7.6. The lowest DCR was expec-
tantly observed at the lowest tested temperature of −20 ◦C and was 158 cps. At 28 V
above breakdown voltage the detection efficiency was maximum and measured 53 %.
Timing jitter at those conditions was 210 ps.
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Figure 7.2: 1-channel SPD mounted in a characterization setup
Figure 7.3: Bracket for 1-channel prototype
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Figure 7.4: Electronics scheme for 1-channel
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Figure 7.5: DCR of the 1-channel prototype SPD
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Figure 7.6: Characterization results of the 1-channel prototype SPD
DCR and detection efficiency was measured at four temperatures (+20, 0, -10, −20 ◦C) and four
bias voltages (5, 10, 15 and 20 V above breakdown voltage) to determine the most beneficial
regime for the satellite SPD prototype. At −20 ◦C also the detection timing jitter was
measured, and added three bias voltages: 28, 40 and 56 V.
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7.3 4-channel prototype SPD
Based on the obtained results with our 1-channel prototype we designed and build
the 4-channel prototype (Fig. 7.7). Also Excelitas Si-SLiK fiber-coupled APDs were
used. The electronics boards were independant for each channel, and the scheme was
the same as designed for 1-channel SPD (Fig. 7.4).
Figure 7.7: 4-channel prototype detectors module. Side view
The size of the DM is 30× 127× 143 mm, and weight is 516 g. It consumes 2.3 W of electrical
power, while cooling APDs down to −20 ◦C. (photo c○ Vadim Makarov)
Four channels were characterized one by one.
Results for breakdown voltages at four temperatures are shown in the Fig. 7.9.
DCRs were measured over 100 s and then averaged to minimize uncertainty, results
are shown in the Fig. 7.10. All four SPDs demonstrated low DCR at −20 ◦C. Even
at 28 V above breakdown, the DCR is 35 cps and less.
In the Fig. 7.8 an example of a characterization log for the channel A at −20 ◦C
Number of Dark Counts at Breakdown Voltages and Voltage Increments at Various Temperatures Comparator resistor R7=100 ohm
E(photon)
f
h
14.00000 c
4.32000 lambda
Temp: -20 C
Breakdown Voltage [V]: 310
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Figure 7.8: Characterization of the 4-channel prototype channel A
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Figure 7.9: Characterization. Breakdown voltage measurement
is demonstrated. The detection efficiency was measured by calibration method, de-
scribed in details in Chapter 4. Laser pulses at 820 nm were generated with frequency
30 kHz, attenuated by variable digital attenuator and ND filters by 68 dB and de-
tected by an SPD under test. The optical average power of the laser was measured
by a power meter connected to one arm of a fiber coupler, installed immediately at the
laser output. Then, detection efficiency was calculated as (detected photons)/(sent photons).
Results for detection efficiency measurement are shown in the Fig. 7.11. The highest
efficiency of 49.6–51% was observed at 28 V above breakdown voltage.
The detection timing jitter was measured as time delay between laser pulse and
an SPD output, and statistic was collected over about 500,000 pulses, the results
histogrammed, and the timing jitter determined as full width of the half maximum
(FWHM) of the histogram. Results are shown in the Fig. 7.11.
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Figure 7.10: Characterization. DCR measurement
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Figure 7.11: Characterization. Efficiency and jitter measurement
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7.4 Discussion and conclusion
We have built and characterized the four channel SPD prototype with Excelitas SLiK
Si-APDs.
Based on the results of the characterization of the four-channel prototype, the optimal
working points were determined as shown in Fig. 7.12.
Detector parameters at working points
Temper.[°C -10 -20 -10 -20
V breakd. 315 310 323 317
V bias. [V] 343 338 351 345
Dark count 105 35 28 7
Eﬃciency [
Jitter [ps]
Temper.[°C -10 -20 -10 -20
V breakd. 337 332 335 330
V bias. [V] 365 360 363 358
Dark count 80 24 36 30
Eﬃciency [
Jitter [ps]
50 51
320
Detector C Detector D
50
325
295 295
51
Detector A Detector B
Figure 7.12: Parameters of detectors for the optimal working points
Our SPD prototype was mounted on an aircraft in flight and successfully used in
the Airborne demonstration of QKD receiver payload experiment [132]. Using BB84
decoy-state protocol, the QKD was established between the stationary ground station
and the moving receiver over optical links of 3–10 km, resulting in generating secure
key up to 868 kb in length. Different pass configurations were tested, simulating
possible satellite trajectories.
Apparatus used in the experiment either are already suitable for satellite use, or have
a clear path-to-flight. Some components need to be replaced with radiation hard
versions. APDs in the satellite receiver module will develop high dark counts under
space radiation, that will aggravate their performance, as will be studied extensively
in the next chapter. However, mitigating radiation damage with cooling and thermal
[120] or laser annealing [108] can keep detectors parameters acceptable for QKD. A
space-suitable DM prototype is under development.
Our experiment proved feasibility of QKD with a quantum receiver placed on a
flying aircraft and the whole receiver prototype has a clear path-to-flight. Therefore,
a feasibility and convenience of up-link approach with its opportunity to interchange
quantum sources has been demonstrated.
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Chapter 8
Radiation test and mitigating radiation
damage
8.1 Radiation test motivation
Single-photon detectors (SPDs) have been utilized in a number of space applications,
including laser ranging (LIDAR) for atmospheric and topology measurements of the
Earth [135, 136], elementary particle scintillation detectors [137], and precise laser
time transfer [138]. SPDs will also be necessary to support quantum communication
applications [31, 56, 57, 111, 113, 139], where high detection efficiency, low timing
jitter, low dark count rate (DCR) and low afterpulsing probability are key param-
eters for achieving successful, high-fidelity transmissions [56, 133]. Photomultiplier
tubes (PMTs) and silicon avalanche photodiodes (APDs) are two types of SPDs that
generally have good performance for this application, whereas superconducting nano-
wire detectors may offer better performance, in some respects, at the cost of being
significantly less practical, requiring cryogenic cooling [59].
For optical transmissions through the atmosphere, a low-loss window exists at around
800 nm wavelength [56]. PMTs have reduced detection efficiencies for wavelengths
longer than 650 nm, but silicon-based APDs have high detection efficiency in that
region, low timing jitter, low DCR, and low afterpulsing, making them a prime
candidate technology for quantum communication applications. However, incident
radiation significantly increases the DCR of APDs [119, 140–143], which can quickly
turn an APD unsuitable for quantum communications on a space platform.
Successful ground-to-satellite quantum communication requires each detector’s DCR
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to be kept below about 200 counts per second (cps) [56]. Previous use of silicon APD
technology (specifically, Excelitas SLiK devices) for photon detection on a satellite
showed an increase in dark count rates by ∼30 cps for each day in orbit [136], which
would make them unusable for quantum communications in merely a few weeks.
Other ground-based radiation tests of APDs also demonstrated DCRs of thousands
cps [119, 140–143], which is too high for quantum communications.
Recently reported tests attempted mitigation by cooling to temperatures as low as
−20 ◦C to overcome the increased DCR [119]. It is known that the DCR of non-
irradiated APDs can be reduced by deeper cooling, decreasing the rate of thermally
induced spontaneous avalanches [77], but at the same time cooling increases the life-
times of trapped carriers that contribute to afterpulsing, which may interfere with
quantum communication [77, 120]. Thermal annealing was also found to reduce the
DCR after irradiation [119, 141, 143]. However, no previously reported tests have
applied deep cooling to radiation damaged APDs, nor have any demonstrated a suf-
ficiently low DCR required for quantum communications, specifically quantum key
distribution (QKD), or verified other detector parameters throughout a reasonable
lifetime (e.g., 1 year for an initial demonstrator mission) of a quantum receiver satel-
lite.
Here we experimentally show that the effects of radiation doses approximately equiva-
lent to as much as 2 years in low-Earth orbit are successfully mitigated by cooling and
thermal annealing, allowing APDs to be used in a quantum satellite. We have tested
three APD device models—Excelitas C30921SH and Laser Components SAP500S2
(each with sensitive areas 500µm in diameter), and Excelitas SLiK (with sensitive
area 180µm in diameter)—and one PMT device model—Hamamatsu H7422P-40.
All samples survived irradiation and remained functional photon detectors, with the
only significant effect being the increase of the DCR in all APD samples. Breakdown
voltage, afterpulsing, detection efficiency and timing jitter of the irradiated APDs
were characterized and shown to be in the range acceptable for quantum commu-
nications. PMTs were also tested for dark counts, timing jitter, afterpulsing and
detection efficiency.
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8.2 Radiation test: chosen orbit, radiation doses, tested sam-
ples
SPDs in low-Earth orbit experience space radiation primarily in the form of protons,
electrons and heavy ions, resulting in two types of permanent damage in the semi-
conductor material: displacement and ionization damage [144–146]. APDs are less
sensitive to ionization damage; e.g., Ref. [119] demonstrated that after 1-year equiv-
alent ionization damage (in a 800 km equatorial orbit) Si APDs increased DCRs up
to 2 times. However, displacement damage causes new defects in the semiconductor
lattice of the active area, significantly affecting the DCR; e.g., in Ref. [119] DCR of
APD irradiated by protons increased by one to two orders of magnitude (limited by
a saturated passive quenching window comparator).
Dark current in APDs originates from two main components: surface currents, which
are unaffected by gain, and bulk leakage current which passes through the avalanche
region and is therefore gain multiplied. Bulk dark current generation is linked di-
rectly to non-ionizing energy loss in a variety of silicon semiconductors [147]. Ion-
ization damage is mainly associated with surface oxide interface dark current, and
was not directly considered in this study. Afterpulsing is caused by delayed emission
of trapped charge from bulk defects, in a thermally activated process (analogous to
charge transfer efficiency losses in charge-coupled devices).
Proton displacement damage arises due to structural displacements in the silicon
crystal caused by elastic collisions, and inelastic spallation reactions. The distribution
of energies of trapped protons in low-Earth orbit environment, transported through
10 mm of aluminum shielding (equivalent to the shielding provided by the satellite
structure), possesses a broad peak in the range of 50 to 75 MeV. Here the ratio
between elastic and inelastic energy loss ranges from 1.7 to 1.2, whereas at 100 MeV
the ratio is roughly 1.0. Following a commonly accepted silicon damage deposition
model [148], we calculated the monochromatic proton fluence that produces the same
average specific non-ionizing energy loss in silicon.
Due to this difference in the energy distribution ratio, the physical range of damage
fragments through the sensitive microvolume of the detector will also be different,
because inelastic reactions result in a much greater variance in the range of fragments
in the silicon, compared to elastic damage which is uniformly distributed through-
out. (That is, the damage energy equilibrium may not be established until several
micrometers below the Si surface from the direction of incident proton flux.) This
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would result in under-dosing of the first few micrometers near the surface of the
APD—at 100 MeV, damage equilibrium is not reached until about 3 to 5 µm be-
neath the surface [148]. However, Ref. [149], which shows the internal structure of
different types of APD, suggests that the important amplification region is typically
tens of micrometers below the surface, where these small damage energy distribution
differences will not be a major factor.
Following Ref. [56], we chose a polar orbit at 600 km altitude, providing global cover-
age, and is representative for our anticipated quantum satellite. With a hypothetical
shielding of 10-mm-thick aluminum around the detectors, which is an approximate
equivalent to the shielding provided by a satellite structure, the predicted radiation
doses were calculated using the SPENVIS radiation modeling tool for durations of
0.6, 6, 12, and 24 months. The radiation doses were determined to be equivalent to
100 MeV proton fluences of 108, 109, 2× 109, and 4× 109 cm−2, respectively.
We tested a total of 32 APD devices and 4 PMT devices. These samples were divided
among nine groups (see Table 8.1). We applied each of the four fluences to the first
four groups with the devices switched off. For the fifth group, APD bias voltage was
applied during irradiation at the highest fluence (24 month equivalent) to examine
whether bias voltage affects the extent of damage caused by irradiation. The last
group of samples was kept as a control group, being stored and transported alongside
the other five groups, but without undergoing irradiation. The irradiation was done
at the Tri-University Meson Facility (TRIUMF) at the University of British Columbia
using a 106 MeV proton beam, which was slightly higher energy than the nominal
100 MeV.
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Table 8.1: Tested devices and radiation doses
Nine groups of tested samples and their corresponding nominal radiation fluences,
equivalent to in-orbit exposures over 0.6, 6, 12, and 24 months with protons at
100 MeV. Each APD in group 5 was biased during irradiation at 20 V above
its breakdown voltage. Group 9 was not irradiated, and kept as a control.
Group
Device type and
quantity
Fluence @
100 MeV,
protons/cm2
1
SLiK – 2 pcs
SAP500S2 – 2 pcs
108
2
SLiK – 2 pcs
SAP500S2 – 2 pcs
109
3
SLiK – 2 pcs
SAP500S2 – 2 pcs
C30921SH – 2 pcs
2× 109
4
SLiK – 2 pcs
SAP500S2 – 2 pcs
C30921SH – 2 pcs
4× 109
5
SLiK – 2 pcs
SAP500S2 – 2 pcs
C30921SH – 2 pcs
4× 109 (biased)
6 H7422-40 – 1 pc 109
7 H7422-40 – 1 pc 2× 109
8 H7422-40 – 1 pc 4× 109
9
SLiK – 2 pcs
SAP500S2 – 2 pcs
C30921SH – 2 pcs
H7422-40 – 1 pc
0
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8.3 Characterization setup
For each group, each APD sample was assembled on an aluminum plate, with a PCB
attached from the back (see Fig. 8.1). A thermistor was attached to each plate to
observe the local temperature. During irradiation, five groups of APDs and three
PMTs were attached to a single aluminum frame (Fig. 8.2) connected to an electrical
ground. To suppress spontaneous thermal annealing of radiation damage during the
irradiation process, the frame was cooled to ≈0 ◦C with chilled antifreeze pumped
through copper tubes epoxied to the frame. This cooling also allowed us to conduct
some testing of the APDs in situ, and observe the changing dark count rate during
the irradiation process for group 5. (Without cooling, APD DCRs after irradiation
could not be measured at room temperature, as our devices would be saturated.)
Figure 8.1: One group of tested APDs.
One group of APDs, consisting of two SLiK devices (top), two C30921SH devices (bottom left),
and two SAP500S2 devices (bottom right). (The device under the black cap, center, is not
discussed in this paper.) The detectors are connected to a PCB with 6 passive quenching
circuits, attached to the back of the plate. Bias voltage supply and signal cables can be seen
exiting from behind (far bottom).
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For each of our APDs we used a passive quenching circuit with quenching resistance
of 403 kΩ, similar to that described in Ref. [74] as a passive quenching circuit with
current-mode output. This type of quenching circuit is appropriate for a quantum
receiver satellite because of its simplicity and robustness, protecting against exces-
sive current due to, e.g., bright illumination or charged particles, or accidental high
voltage spikes. Its maximum detection rate of 0.2–0.4 Mcps is lower compared to
active quenching circuits, but sufficient for the detection rates expected in near-term
QKD applications [56]. Conveniently, the long (>1 µs) dead-time of this circuit
suppresses afterpulsing, even at low temperatures. Circuits for all APDs in a group
were mounted on the same circuit board, outputting avalanche pulses through coaxial
signal cables connected to each detector’s cathode.
The breakdown voltage of each detector was found by gradually increasing the applied
bias voltage until pulses due to dark counts began to appear in the trace of an
oscilloscope. The oscilloscope was also used to observe the shape of the pulse at the
nominal operating condition of 20 V excess bias. To determine detection performance
properties, avalanche pulses were collected from each device, discriminated at 50 mV
threshold and time-tagged with a resolution of 156.25 ps, while applied bias voltages
and thermal parameters were simultaneously recorded at 10 Hz.
For measuring timing response properties and detection efficiency, each APD group
was illuminated with a pulsing 780 nm reference laser emerging from a single-mode
fiber. An optical test rig (see Fig. 8.3) was assembled that held the optical fiber and
a lens in place at ≈20 cm distance from the detector group plate. The attenuation
and divergence of the laser beam was chosen such that less than one photon per
pulse would be incident on each detector. The optical test rig was placed in a cold
freezer (Fig. 8.4) to perform low-temperature tests down to −86 ◦C. The DCRs of
the samples were measured either in the optical test rig with reference laser turned
off, or while on the main aluminum frame within a light-tight enclosure. DCRs
were averaged over several minutes (up to 15) of collected data to minimize uncer-
tainty. Afterpulsing probability was calculated from DCR measurement data using
an improved afterpulsing analysis [150]. For timing jitter and efficiency measure-
ments, counts were collected for 15 minutes or until about 106 detection events were
registered (whichever came first).
All PMT measurements were taken while operating at −5 ◦C (one of the pre-set work-
ing temperatures of the in-built cooler). The measurements of DCR and afterpulsing
were done similarly as for APDs. For timing jitter and detection efficiency, we used
a pulsed reference laser at 690 nm wavelength, with an Excelitas SLiK acting as a
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calibrated reference to determine the absolute efficiency.
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Figure 8.2: The main aluminum frame with all detectors groups installed
Upper figure, front view. 5 APD (right and middle column) and 3 PMT (leftmost column)
groups—mounted prior to irradiation. Chilled antifreeze flowing through the copper tubing
keeps the frame at 0 ◦C. A dry, insulating light-tight box (not shown) was placed around the
frame. Lower figure, back view with cables attached.
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Figure 8.3: Assembly for the APDs characterization.
Figure 8.4: Optical rig with APD group 1 installed is placed in the freezer.
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8.4 Test schedule
Prior to irradiation, we measured the breakdown voltage, DCR, efficiency, timing
jitter and afterpulsing probability of all APD samples at −20 ◦C. Group 4 and the
control group were also characterized at lower temperatures. PMTs were tested for
DCR, efficiency, timing jitter and afterpulsing probability.
At TRIUMF on June 12-13, 2014, each APD group (apart from the control) was
in turn characterized for breakdown and DCR, then irradiated for a duration corre-
sponding to the desired fluence for that group (actual applied fluences were within
1% of desired, except for group 1 which received 4% greater fluence). Immediately
after irradiation the APDs were re-characterized for breakdown and DCR. These pre-
and post-irradiation characterizations were performed in situ, at 0 ◦C, to minimize
the influence of spontaneous thermal annealing. Uniquely, group 5, which received
the same fluence as group 4, was held biased with its DCR recorded during the
irradiation. Each PMT group was irradiated to the desired fluence, but no PMT
measurements were taken in situ.
After irradiation, the APD and PMT samples were packed in a thermally isolated
box filled with dry ice for transportation. This box provided temperatures no higher
than −12 ◦C during the 48 hour transit. Following this, the samples were kept in
a freezer at about −20 ◦C between tests. All APD samples were re-tested at 0 ◦C
for breakdown voltage and DCR upon arriving from the radiation facility, with no
significant changes observed. PMTs were recharacterized at −5 ◦C.
All APD samples were then characterized (breakdown, DCR, efficiency, jitter, and
afterpulsing probability) at temperatures ranging from −20 ◦C to −86 ◦C, allowing us
to assess the effectiveness of cooling to mitigate damage due to irradiation. Finally,
we performed thermal annealing on some groups at varying hot temperatures and
durations, with further characterization at selected stages and cold temperatures.
8.5 Effects of radiation damage
All irradiated APDs exhibited a significant increase in their DCRs, illustrated in
Fig. 8.5 for −86 ◦C operating temperature, consistent with previous studies [119, 140,
141]. The DCR increase in each device followed the radiation dose applied, condi-
tional that operating temperatures were kept sufficiently low—at high temperatures,
the device count rates saturated. At high doses and standard operating temperatures,
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Figure 8.5: DCR of APDs as function of radiation dose
Measurement was taken at −86 ◦C operation with APDs biased 20 V above their breakdown
voltages. In every case, radiation damage caused a DCR increase. The APDs biased during
irradiation developed a noticeably higher dark count rate.
the DCRs of all devices would prevent successful quantum communications—for ex-
ample, Excelitas SLiK devices (overall the best performing devices) operating at
−20 ◦C exhibit DCRs of the order of 105 cps.
No significant changes in breakdown voltages, pulse shapes or efficiency owing to
irradiation were observed. The timing jitter of detection pulses when operating at
low temperatures did not change for SLiK and SAP500S2 samples, and increased by
100 ps for C30921SH (see Fig. 8.6). However, the timing jitter when operating at
higher temperatures appeared to increase for all the irradiated APDs—for example,
within group 4 at −20 ◦C operation, jitter increased for SLiKs by up to 80 ps, for
SAP500S2 by up to 300 ps, and for C30921SH by up to 250 ps. This increased
timing jitter is likely due to the operation of the passive quenching mechanism at a
high count rate: in this condition, avalanches often trigger before the APD voltage
has fully recovered, leading to effectively lower bias voltages, which are known to
have higher jitter [74], for these events. Furthermore, the variation in effective bias
voltages between events leads to variable current rise-times at the discriminator, and
thus time-tagged events with delays dependent on the stochastic arrival of adjacent
avalanches. We remark that lower jitter values than those observed in our experiment
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Figure 8.6: Timing response histogram of APDs from group 4, before and after proton
irradiation
Normalized timing response histogram for representative APDs from group 4 was measured
before and after irradiation at −60 ◦C using a pulsed laser. The time intervals were measured
from a laser pulse to the APD’s output pulse caused by a photon from the same laser pulse.
The full width half maximum (FWHM) of the histogram determines an APD’s timing jitter.
Before irradiation the timing jitter was ≈ 600 ps for SLiK, ≈ 550 ps for C30921SH, and ≈ 700 ps
for SAP500S2. Changes in the baseline count probabilities are due to the changes in DCRs. At
full width half maximum there is no noticeable change in the timing response of SLiKs and
SAP500S2 before and after irradiation, and a moderate increase of 100 ps was observed for
C30921SH. Measured timing jitter includes timing jitter of the laser and time tagger.
can be obtained by optimizing detector electronics [132, 151].
The probability of afterpulses increased for SLiK and C30921SH samples after irra-
diation (Fig. 8.7), likely due to an increased number of defects in the semiconductor
crystal structure. For SAP500S2, the afterpulsing results did not show a consistent
trend. Note that the afterpulsing probabilities for all SAP500S2 devices, including
those in the control group, were remarkably high at lower temperatures, reaching
30%. A longer dead-time than that provided by our circuit is clearly needed for
correct operation of SAP500S2 [152].
APDs biased during the irradiation (group 5) developed higher DCRs than those that
received the same fluence while unbiased (group 4). This result may be an important
factor when planning an operational schedule for devices in an orbiting satellite—
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Figure 8.7: Afterpulsing probability as function of radiation dose
Afterpulsing probability, measured at −86 ◦C, which increased for SLiK and C30921SH devices
during the first 6 to 12 month equivalent radiation dose. SAP500S2 results are high and
inconsistent with respect to the applied radiation.
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Figure 8.8: DCR of APDs biased during irradiation
The highlighted portion represents the period of irradiation. While the irradiation is on, the
DCR of each APD increases until saturation in the passive quenching circuit, after which
saturation causes an apparent (not real) decrease in the DCRs. After irradiation ceased, actual
DCRs slightly improved due to spontaneous annealing, leading to an apparent DCR rise in the
over-saturated samples.
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Table 8.2: PMTs’ characteristics before and after irradiation
Four tested PMTs, their corresponding nominal fluences, equivalent to in-orbit exposures
over 6, 12, and 24 months, their DCRs, afterpulsing probabilities, and jitters before and
after radiation, and their detection efficiency. PMTs were not powered during the radiation.
The PMT from group 9 was not irradiated, and kept as a control.
Group
Fluence
@100 MeV,
protons/ cm2
Before irradiation After irradiation
DCR,
cps
Afterpulsing,
%
Jitter,
ps
DCR,
cps
Afterpulsing,
%
Jitter,
ps
Efficiency,
%
6 109 6.25 3.4 600 399 1.1 660 23
7 2× 109 14.4 13.8 550 592 0.76 640 23
8 4× 109 7 166 600 10 45 400 21
9 0 5 0.22 590 0.5 0.22 590 20
for example, it may be preferable that the detectors are off while crossing regions
with higher radiation levels, such as the South Atlantic Anomaly [153]. Fig. 8.8
demonstrates the dynamic change of DCRs of the APDs during irradiation. Note
that all devices eventually exhibit over-saturation behavior [154] during the in-situ
test.
Table 8.2 shows the measured properties of the PMTs. In general, DCRs increased
noticeably and exceeded the 200 cps desired for QKD. Anomalously, however, the
PMT under the highest fluence experienced a DCR increase of merely 43%. Given
that this sample also exhibited 166% afterpulsing probability prior to irradiation
(and 45% afterwards), it seems that the device may be defective and its properties
unrepresentative. (Although, owing to a lack of time, the PMTs were not aged prior
to the experiment, as is recommended by Hamamatsu. This resulted in generally
elevated afterpulsing probabilities before irradiation.) DCRs as presented in Table 8.2
were measured at 19 days after irradiation. A second DCR measurement was also
performed 27 days after irradiation, where it was observed to have decreased by 10
to 25% since the first measurement, possibly due to self-annealing, despite the PMTs
being kept in a freezer at −20◦C.
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Figure 8.9: Cooling effect on DCRs before and after irradiation
Cooling effect on DCRs of group 4 (24 month equivalent dose). Pre-irradiation data are
connected with dashed lines, post-irradiation with solid lines, and the control group with dotted
lines. DCRs decrease with temperature exponentially for irradiated and non-irradiated samples.
8.6 Mitigation of radiation damage in APDs
8.6.1 Cooling
Measurements of the detection properties of the samples reveal that radiation-induced
DCRs decrease with temperature exponentially for all irradiated APDs, following the
same trend as for non-radiated APDs. For SLiKs from group 4, irradiated with a
24-month-in-orbit equivalent dose, DCR dropped to 200 cps at about −80 ◦C (see
Fig. 8.9). The drop of DCR with temperature followed an exponential gradient of
about factor 2 per 8 ◦C, which is the same factor as for non-irradiated samples. The
breakdown voltage, efficiency, and timing jitter demonstrated no significant change,
though the afterpulsing probability increased significantly as lower temperatures pro-
longed the release of trapped carriers [155]. The maximum afterpulsing probabilities
in group 4 measured at −86 ◦C are 2.7% for SLiKs, 31% for SAP500S2, and 1.7% for
C30921S2.
Although afterpulsing is higher, we can conclude that, given sufficient cooling, SLiK
SPDs can serve well for quantum protocols even after 24 months in orbit. Notably,
the required temperatures are significantly above those typically reached by cryogenic
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coolers, and though the cooling necessary might represent a significant power demand
on a small satellite system, it is nevertheless achievable. In a larger satellite or an
orbital station it could be easily implemented, e.g., by using solid-state thermoelectic
coolers (TECs).
8.6.2 Thermal annealing
We applied thermal annealing to all our irradiated APD samples except those in
group 2 (which were set aside for laser annealing tests taking place separately [108]).
Samples were left at room temperature (+20◦C) and in a hot-air-flow oven at +50,
+80 and +100±1.5 ◦C for various lengths of time. After a week of annealing at room
temperature there was an observed decrease of DCR, down to a factor relative to
pre-annealing rates as low as 0.57 for SAP500S2 samples, and 0.71 for SLiK samples.
While interesting, this rate of improvement is almost certainly too slow to be useful
on a satellite platform.
For thermal annealing at higher temperatures we built a convection oven, implement-
ing a hot-air gun as a heater, see the Fig. 8.10. The stability of the temperature in
the oven was ±0.5 ◦C.
All oven-annealed APDs demonstrated more significant decreases of DCRs, with the
most improvement achieving a factor 0.15 times the original pre-annealing DCR for a
SLiK APD from group 3 annealed at +50, +80 and +100 ◦C (see Fig. 8.11)—almost
a full order of magnitude DCR improvement. SAP500S2 samples saw factors as low
as 0.28, and C30921SH as low as 0.3, compared to pre-annealing DCRs, both from
group 4 annealed at +80 and +100 ◦C (see Fig. 8.12).
Instead of the oven, we utilized in-built TECs for annealing of SLiKs from group
3 at +100 ◦C, as this approach has the potential to simplify annealing within orbit
conditions. To achieve +100 ◦C at the sensitive area while the package is at room
temperature, a SLiK’s TEC consumes 0.41 W of electrical power. The total annealing
time with TECs was 8 h. One of the SLiKs demonstrated steady improvement of the
dark count rate during that time, though the second SLiK showed some degradation
after 4 h of annealing (Fig. 8.11).
Breakdown voltage, detection efficiency, afterpulsing and timing response jitter of all
APDs demonstrated no notable change after thermal annealing.
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Figure 8.10: Setup for thermal annealing of a group of APDs
Upper figure, our convection oven; lower figure, an APD group placed inside the oven,
thermocouple sensor attached to the aluminum group plate.
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Figure 8.11: Thermal annealing of APDs from group 3
DCRs measured at −20 ◦C after annealing of APDs from group 3 at +50 ◦C over 1 h, at +80 ◦C
over 45 min, and for SLiK samples after further annealing at +100 ◦C over 8 h. DCRs of all
APDs decrease significantly during 45 minutes of +80 ◦C annealing, and continue to decrease
for a SLiK during +100 ◦C annealing, through the DCR of one of the two SLiKs increased
during last 4 hours.
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Figure 8.12: Thermal annealing of APDs from group 4
DCRs measured at −20 ◦C after annealing of APDs from group 4 at +80 ◦C over 4 h, followed
by annealing at +100 ◦C over 1 h. The most significant decrease of DCRs for all APDs occurred
during the first hour of +80 ◦C annealing, but DCRs still continued to improve with additional
annealing.
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Figure 8.13: Experimental setup.
(a) Setup for laser annealing and characterization at room temperature. (b) Setup for
characterization at −80 ◦C. SM: single-mode optic fiber; MM: multi-mode optic fiber; O/E:
optical-to-electrical. (Figure is re-printed from [108]).
8.6.3 Laser annealing
It was shown in [156] that laser annealing can decrease DCR of non-irradiated APDs
by up to 5.4 times.
We performed laser annealing (the project was led by Jin Gyu Lim) on nine irradiated
APDs (see Table 8.3) and demonstrated a significant improvement in DCRs for all
samples [108]. Our experiment demonstrated an advantage of laser annealing over
thermal annealing of APDs for reducing DCR, also we obtained a good results of the
laser annealing of thermally pre-annealed APDs, as their DCRs was reduced farther
more.
Experimental setup for laser annealing and characterization of tested samples is
shown in Fig. 8.13. The samples under test were placed in the module, that was
moved between annealing and characterization setups for characterization after each
step of annealing. The laser annealing setup shown in Fig. 8.13(a) is an updated
version of the setup used in [156]. APD samples were inserted in a detector group
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Table 8.3: Summary of detector samples, applied radiation, previous thermal annealing,
and measured results of laser annealing. (Table is re-printed from [108].)
Sample
ID
106 MeV
proton
fluence
(cm−2)
Equivalent
time in
600 km
polar
orbit
(months)
Thermal
annealing
procedure
Dark count rate at −80 ◦C
Annea-
ling
power
(W)
Vexcess
(V)Before
(Hz)
Lowest
after
(Hz)
Highest
reduc-
tion
factor
Typical
for pre-
radiation
(Hz)
C30902SH-
1 10
9 6 None 347 2.3 150
}
∼ 5 0.8 14
C30902SH-
2 10
9 6 None 363 2.64 137 1.5 14
SLiK-1 108 0.6 2 h @ +100 ◦C 6.71 0.16 41.7

< 1
1.4 14
SLiK-2 108 0.6 2 h @ +100 ◦C 2.19 0.42 5.3 0.8 14
SLiK-3 4× 109 24 4 h @ +80 ◦C,2 h @ +100 ◦C 43.1 2.09 21 1.4 14
SLiK-4 109 6 None 192 8.3 23 1.0 20
SLiK-5 4× 109
24
(applied
bias
voltage)
3 h @ +80 ◦C,
2 h @ +100 ◦C 447 58 7.7 1.0 20
SAP500S2-
1 4× 109 24 4 h @ +80
◦C,
2 h @ +100 ◦C 1579 2.08 758
 ∼ 2 1.4 20
SAP500S2-
2 10
8 0.6 2 h @ +100 ◦C 213 1.66 128 1.6 20
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plate used for radiation experiment (see Fig. 8.1), which could be moved between
the laser annealing and characterization setups. Two 808 n lasers LD1 (signaling)
and LD2 (annealing) are overlapped in a purpose, that two lasers beams would be
focused at the same spot. Then we could adjust position of a tested APD, checking
it with the low power laser LD1, and the high-power laser beam from LD2 will be
focused at the same point on the APD’s active area. LD1 also served for measuring
SLiKs’ photon detection efficiency, done in-situ. The detector module is mounted on
an XYZ translation stage, which can move between the laser annealing setup and a
camera. The free-space part of the setup is black-outed.
For APDs’ characterization we measured DCR, relative changes in photon efficiency,
afterpulsing probability and timing jitter. For afterpulsing analysis we used the
method described in Chapter 4. As all the irradiated APDs demonstrated so high
DCR that their electronic circuits were saturated, we characterized them at −80 ◦C,
see our characterization setup in Fig. 8.13(b). SLiKs have an in-built thermoelec-
tric cooler (TEC) and a thermistor, thus they could be characterized in our laser-
annealing setup at −30 ◦C as well. All APDs were characterized at 20 V above
breakdown, as other characterizations in the radiation test were done. For character-
ization we used a 780 nm laser LD3. Single photon detection efficiency was measured
in a relative way, similarly to described in Section 8.3 and other characterization
parameters were also measured similarly to Section 8.3.
Laser annealing was done in a step-wise manner: 60 s of annealing was followed by
60 s of cooling down at room temperature before characterization. Two APDs SLik-4
and SLiK-5 were annealed by a single laser shot of 1 W power, to test if the step-wise
process was different from a single annealing event.
The main result of laser annealing was a dramatic decrease of DCR, see results
represented in the Table 8.3. The maximum DCR decrease for SLiKs was from 5.3 to
41.7 times at −80 ◦C. SliKs annealed by one-shot laser power demonstrated similar
results as SLiKs annealed with the step-wise method. For C30902SH the maximum
DCR reduction was from 137 to 150 times at −80 ◦C. Also, there was no difference
in effects observed between a single laser shot and step-wise annealing methods. For
SAP500S2 the maximum DCR reduction was 128 and 758 times.
For detailed results of APDs characterization see [108]. In summary, detection ef-
ficiency did not change notably for SLiKs and C30921SHs, but changed depending
on annealing laser power for SAP500S2s. Note that SAP500S2 found to withstand
much less laser power before destruction. Afterpulsing increased after laser annealing
in SLiKs and C30921SH samples, through decreased in SAP500S2. But the last ones
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showed a very high afterpulsing at −80 ◦C even before irradiation, and after laser
annealing their afterpulsing was of orders of magnitudes higher than for SLiKs and
C30921SHs.
8.7 Discussion and conclusion
We have conducted radiation tests of 32 APD (Excelitas and Laser Components) and
4 PMT (Hamamatsu) SPD devices, with radiation levels equivalent to lifetimes in
low-Earth 600 km polar orbit of 0.6 months, 6 months, 12 months and 24 months. Our
performance characterization measurements showed a significant increase in DCRs
for all APD devices, while there was no measurable radiation-induced degradation
in the photon detection efficiency and timing jitter, and only a small increase in the
afterpulsing probability.
All APD samples demonstrated a significant increase in DCR due to radiation ex-
posure, increasing the DCR by many orders of magnitude, well above the maximum
200 cps or so required for quantum communications tasks. Subsequently, we have
experimentally demonstrated that radiation damage can be successfully mitigated by
sufficient cooling. For Excelitas SLiK devices, cooling to −86 ◦C was sufficient to re-
store the DCR to below the 200 cps level that would make quantum communications
possible, even after 24-month-equivalent radiation dose.
Further DCR reduction (while preserving other performance properties) was obtained
through thermal annealing. APD devices were heated at +50 to +100 ◦C over a few
hours, in the best case resulting in a DCR only 0.15 times that prior to annealing. It
is worth noting that this approach can reduce the amount of cooling power required
to reach the targeted low DCR—e.g., following annealing, the SLiK APDs could
achieve the target DCR of 200 cps at about −70 ◦C, 16 ◦C higher than prior to
annealing. Thermal annealing at +80 to +100 ◦C seems to be the most effective, but
some additional tests are required to optimize the thermal annealing for radiation
damaged APDs.
Results from the PMT samples indicated a small (but still noticable) degradation
in DCR and almost no degradation in any other measured property (efficiency, tim-
ing jitter, and afterpulsing probability) after applied radiation. This makes them a
tantalizing candidate, particularly for optical inter-satellite communication applica-
tions. However, as their peak efficiency is at wavelengths where atmospheric losses
are higher, they remain less interesting for ground–satellite links.
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We note that, while thermal annealing is effective at reducing DCRs of APDs, the
coarse method of oven-heating devices can be time and energy consuming. Alterna-
tive, more directed approaches such as laser annealing [108] could be beneficial under
a limited power budget of a satellite platform.
Our measurements correspond to the case where an APD is embedded on an orbiting
satellite for up to two years prior to thermal or laser annealing being applied. In a real
satellite mission, either of annealing methods could be applied intermittently and at
regular intervals through a mission’s lifetime. We speculate that doing so could repair
some of the radiation-induced damage soon after it is created, thereby keeping the
DCR low, delaying the necessity of deeper cooling, and extending detector lifetimes.
Implementing thermal or laser annealing and cooling on APDs can extend their life-
time up to 10 years, until performance of QKD protocol will be lowered down to zero
key rate. Experimental tests of the effect of multiple irradiation and annealing cycles
shall be performed in the near future.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion and outlook
Long distance quantum communications and a global quantum network are getting
priority projects in many countries around the world. The quantum network can
be used for QKD to provide unconditional level of security. Many researches has
been done on the way of improving security of QKD implementations and increasing
distances of quantum communications. My thesis contributes to this research by
covering novel and unexplored regimes relevant to commercial QKD on one hand,
and the development of a satellite based QKD system on the other hand.
My first project was participation in a security test of Clavis2 QKD system [89].
Though the result of our experiment demonstrated security of the Clavis2 system
against a straightforward Trojan-horse attack thanks to afterpulsing effect in APDs,
it led to a following research [84] demonstrated that at the wavelength of 1924 nm
the attack can be successful and some countermeasures have to be realized in the
system.
In the later projects during my thesis I placed my efforts mostly on the development of
SPDs suitable for long distance quantum communications or over high loss channels.
One of the projects described in this thesis was dedicated to quantum teleportation
through 144 km free-space channel [33], that was a big achievement at that time.
My contribution to the project was building SPDs with unique parameters, very low
DCR combined with compact size and relatively low price, that made our detectors
excellent candidates for that project.
Long distance quantum communications proved feasibility of ground-to-satellite quan-
tum communications, because the losses of an on-ground long distance quantum
channel are similar or even higher than of a ground-to-LEO satellite link [56]. Global
satellite based quantum network is economically more beneficial than a fiber-based
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ground quantum network, since it does not need so many trusted-nod stations re-
quiring service and protection for security. The first quantum satellites are already
launched by China [37–39] and Singapore [157, 158], and a first satellite based quan-
tum network was demonstrated with the Chinese satellite [52]. A Canadian quantum
satellite mission (Canada’s Quantum Encryption and Science Satellite (QEYSSat))
is planned launching in approximately 2020, and preparation work is in progress.
That satellite will have less functionality than Chinese Micius mission, however it
will be less complex system with smaller mass of 60–80 kg compared to the reported
635 kg for Micius.
Two of my later projects were specifically about building and testing SPDs for long
distance quantum communications in space. One was a four-channel prototype for
Canadian quantum satellite, it was implemented in the Air-borne experiment [132]
(the project in frame of preparation for QEYSSat ) of a demonstration of QKD be-
tween a ground station and a flying Aircraft. The four-channel detector prototype
developed for this project has very light weight and long life time in radiation envi-
ronment. Our detector prototype worked flawlessly during the experiment and the
next generation prototype is already under development in IQC. The second project
was about building an improved version of SPDs used in the teleportation experi-
ment, with very low noise, that could be used in future experiments with free space
long distance quantum communications.
To meet very special requirements to be space qualified, SPDs must pass an evalua-
tion including tests for their mechanical hardness and thermo-vacuum construction,
and radiation test. My last project was about the radiation testing of APDs and
PMTs potentially suitable for QEYSSat, and finding possible methods for mitigating
radiation damage to extend life time of the detectors in space and therefore, life time
of the mission. I was able to show that thermal annealing, cooling, and laser an-
nealing were all very effective in decreasing DCR of irradiated APDs. Comparing to
other recent projects about APDs radiation tests and mitigating radiation damage
[159] in our experiment we implemented deeper cooling decreasing DCR of APDs
down to pre-radiation level, and implemented laser annealing that was not used be-
fore for this purpose. Interesting to note that radiation increased afterpulsing rate of
the irradiated APDs, the effect has not being described previously. Now our group is
working on implementing laser annealing in the quantum satellite prototype in frame
of other projects towards Canadian quantum satellite.
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Appendix A
Software for calculations of afterpulsing and
traps life times
Our software for afterpulsing calculation and lifetime traps curve fitting was written
in Python programming language. It consists of three parts: defaults.py, gui.py,
functions.py.
A.1 defaults.py
1 # default conditions
2 a = 1.1
3 endtime = 1.0
4 start = 78.125*10**−12
5 numofdata = 1000000
6 maxbins = int(math.ceil(math.log(endtime/start)/math.log(a)))
7 resolution = 78.125*10**−12
A.2 functions.py
1 import csv
2 import math
3 import numpy as np
4 import os
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5 import sys
6
7 import default as df
8
9 intpersec = 1 / df.resolution
10
11 # get intial conditions from filename
12 def extract (filename):
13 noext = filename.split(".")[0]
14 nopath = noext.split("/")[−1]
15 conditions = nopath.split(" ")
16 others = []
17 for i in range(len(conditions)):
18 if i > 3:
19 others.append(conditions[i])
20 elif conditions[i][0].isalpha():
21 model = conditions[i]
22 elif conditions[i][−1] == ("C" or "c"):
23 temp = conditions[i]
24 elif conditions [i][−2] == "m":
25 thres = conditions[i]
26 elif conditions [i][−1] == ("V" or "v"):
27 over = conditions[i]
28 return noext, nopath, model, temp, over, thres
29
30 # reads file and stores data from second column into array
31 def parsedata (filename, number=0):
32 num = 0
33 data = []
34 file = open(filename, 'r')
35 for line in file:
36 if number == 0:
37 if not line.strip():
38 continue
39 else:
40 data.append(float(line.split()[1]))
41 elif num < number:
42 if not line.strip():
43 continue
44 else:
45 try:
46 # print " first part %i %f", num, ...
line.split()[1]
47 data.append(float(line.split()[1]))
120
48 except IndexError as ie:
49 print num, line.split()[1]
50 num += 1
51 file.close()
52 return data
53
54 # finds the value to stop taking differences; makes sure last ...
value is last difference in time interval (last first count)
55 def last (data, endtime):
56 sums = 0
57 num = 1
58 last = len(data) − 1
59 while sums < (endtime * intpersec):
60 sums = data[last] − data[last − num]
61 num += 1
62 return last − num + 1
63
64 # get a from specified number of bins and maxbins from a
65 def geta(maxbins, start, endtime):
66 return round(math.e**(math.log(endtime/start)/maxbins), 2)
67
68 def getmaxbins(a, start, endtime):
69 return int(math.ceil(math.log(endtime/start)/math.log(a)))
70
71 # create bins actual values
72 def bins (maxbins, start, a):
73 binslist = [0]
74 for i in range(maxbins+1):
75 binslist.append(start*a**i)
76 return binslist
77
78 def binnum (num, start, a):
79 if num == 0:
80 number = 0
81 elif math.floor(math.log(num/start)/math.log(a)) < 0:
82 number = 0
83 else:
84 number = int(math.floor(math.log(num/start)/math.log(a))) ...
+ 1
85 return number
86
87 # create new array of differences in each bin
88 def differences (lastnum, maxbins, data, start, a, endtime):
89 num = 0
121
90 difflist = [0] * (maxbins + 1)
91 errors = []
92 for i in range(lastnum+1):
93 if (lastnum − i) % 1000 == 0:
94 print lastnum − i
95 j = 1
96 while True:
97 diff = data[i+j] − data[i]
98
99 if diff < (5 * 10 ** −7) * intpersec:
100 print "diff error", i
101 errors.append("%f, %f, %e" % (i, (i+j), (diff * ...
df.resolution)))
102 j+=1
103 continue
104
105 if diff < (endtime * intpersec):
106 num += 1
107 try:
108 difflist[binnum(diff * df.resolution, start, ...
a)] += 1
109 except ValueError, e:
110 #print "ValueError: %s, %i, %i, %f" % ...
(str(e), i, i+j, diff)
111 #print "Errors in Data File"
112 #return
113 #j += 1
114 break
115 j += 1
116 else:
117 break
118 return difflist, errors, num
119
120 # normalization of data
121 def norm (lastnum, maxbins, data, bins):
122 normed = [0] * (maxbins+1)
123 for num in range (0, maxbins+1):
124 if data[num] == 0:
125 normed[num] = 0
126 else:
127 normed[num] = data[num]/((bins[num+1] − bins[num]) * ...
(lastnum + 1))
128 return normed
129
122
130 # finding true dark counts using d as guideline for difference to ...
stop
131 def dark(data, d, maxbins):
132 num = 0
133 sums = data[maxbins−1]
134 for x in range(maxbins−2, 0, −1):
135 diff = data[x] − data[x+1]
136 if abs(diff) ≤ d:
137 num += 1
138 sums += data[x]
139 else:
140 num += 1
141 break
142 if num == 0:
143 return 0
144 else:
145 return sums / num
146
147 # finding afterpulse probability
148 def area(dark, data, bins, maxbins):
149 sums = 0
150 sumsarray=[]
151 array = []
152 for x in range(maxbins+1):
153 array.append(data[x] − dark)
154 length = len(array)
155 start = next(i for i in range(length) if (array[i] > 0))
156 try:
157 end = next(i for i in range(start+1, length) if ...
(array[i+1] ≤ 0 and array[i+2] ≤ 0 and array[i+3] ≤ 0 ...
and array[i+4] ≤ 0))
158 except IndexError:
159 #end = next(i for i in range(start+1, length) if ...
(array[i+1] ≤ 0 and array[i+2] ≤ 0 and array[i+3] ≤ 0))
160 end = next(i for i in range(start+1, length) if ...
(array[i+1] ≤ 0 and array[i+2] ≤ 0))
161 for y in range(start, end+1):
162 sums += array[y] * (bins[y+1] − bins[y])
163 sumsarray.append(sums)
164 return sums, sumsarray, array
165
166 # taking logs of data
167 def log (data, maxbins):
168 logged = [0] * (maxbins+1)
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169 for num in range(len(data)):
170 if data[num] == 0:
171 data[num] = 0
172 else:
173 logged[num] = math.log10(data[num])
174 #print logged[num]
175 return logged
176
177 # finding right x−axis labels; meaningful times: nanosecond, ...
microsecond, millisecond, (0.5, 1, 10, 100), second, (1,2,3,4,5)
178 def time(timesinsec, start, a):
179 num = []
180 for x in timesinsec:
181 if x == 0:
182 num.append(0)
183 else:
184 num.append(math.log(x/start)/math.log(a) + 1)
185 return num
186
187 # check if directory exists, if not then create
188 def makedirec(newdirec):
189 if not os.path.exists(newdirec):
190 os.makedirs(newdirec)
191
192 # write data to files
193 def writeto (filename, data):
194 file = open(filename, "w")
195 num = 1
196 if data == []:
197 file.write("No Errors")
198 for x in data:
199 file.write(str(num) + "\t" + str(x) + "\n")
200 num += 1
201 file.close()
202
203 def wwithnames (filename, data):
204 file = open(filename, "w")
205 for name in data.keys():
206 if isinstance(data[name], dict):
207 for d in data[name].keys():
208 file.write(str(d) + "\t\t" + str(data[name][d]) + ...
"\n")
209 elif isinstance(data[name], list):
210 num = 1
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211 if data[name] == []:
212 file.write(str(name) + "\t\t" + "None" + "\n")
213 for x in data[name]:
214 if num == 1:
215 file.write(str(name) + "\t\t" + str(num) + ...
"\t" + str(x) + "\n")
216 else:
217 file.write("\t\t" + str(num) + "\t" + str(x) ...
+ "\n")
218 num += 1
219 elif isinstance(data[name], np.ndarray):
220 num = 0
221 for x in data[name]:
222 alphabet = "bcfghijklmn"
223 if num == 0:
224 file.write(str(name) + "\t" + ...
str(alphabet[num]) + "\t" + str(x) + "\n")
225 else:
226 file.write("\t\t" + str(alphabet[num]) + "\t" ...
+ str(x) + "\n")
227 num += 1
228 else:
229 file.write(str(name) + "\t\t" + str(data[name]) + "\n")
230 file.close()
231
232 # writing data to table in csv format; if table exists then ...
append, if not then create with headers
233 def writetable(rowdata, headers, path):
234 if not os.path.isfile(path + "table.csv"):
235 table = open(path + "table.csv", "ab")
236 writer = csv.writer(table)
237 writer.writerow(headers)
238 writer.writerow(rowdata)
239 table.close()
240 else:
241 table = open(path + "table.csv", "ab")
242 writer = csv.writer(table)
243 writer.writerow(rowdata)
244 table.close()
245
246 # define functions to fit the data with; 1 − 5 exponents
247 def f1(x, start, a, d, b, c):
248 return b * np.exp(−c * start * a**x) + d
249
125
250 def f2(x, start, a, d, b, c, f, g):
251 return b * np.exp(−c * start * a**x) + f * np.exp(−g * start ...
* a**x) + d
252
253 def f3(x, start, a, d, b, c, f, g, h, i):
254 return b * np.exp(−c * start * a**x) + f * np.exp(−g * start ...
* a**x) + h * np.exp(−i * start * a**x) + d
255
256 def f4(x, start, a, d, b, c, f, g, h, i, j, k):
257 return b * np.exp(−c * start * a**x) + f * np.exp(−g * start ...
* a**x) + h * np.exp(−i * start * a**x) + j * np.exp(−k * ...
start * a**x) + d
258
259 def f5(x, start, a, d, b, c, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m):
260 return b * np.exp(−c * start * a**x) + f * np.exp(−g * start ...
* a**x) + h * np.exp(−i * start * a**x) + j * np.exp(−k * ...
start * a**x) + l * np.exp(−m * start * a**x) + d
A.3 gui.py
1 import matplotlib
2 import math
3 matplotlib.use("TkAgg")
4 import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
5 from matplotlib.backends.backend tkagg import FigureCanvasTkAgg, ...
NavigationToolbar2TkAgg
6 import numpy as np
7 import os
8 from scipy.optimize import curve fit
9 import sys
10 import Tkinter as tk
11 import ttk
12 import tkFileDialog as filedialog
13
14 import default as df
15 import functions as fn
16
17 import logging
18
19 class printTerm(logging.Handler):
20 def init (self, display):
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21 logging.Handler. init (self)
22 self.display = display
23
24 def write(self, s):
25 self.display.configure(state=tk.NORMAL)
26 self.display.insert("end", s)
27 self.display.yview pickplace("end")
28 self.display.configure(state=tk.DISABLED)
29 self.display.see(tk.END)
30 self.display.update idletasks()
31
32 class Program(ttk.Frame):
33
34 def init (self, parent):
35 self.myParent = parent
36 self.myContainer = ttk.Frame(parent)
37
38 self.myContainer.rowconfigure(0, weight=1)
39 self.myContainer.rowconfigure(1, weight=1)
40 self.myContainer.rowconfigure(2, weight=1)
41 self.myContainer.rowconfigure(3, weight=1)
42 self.myContainer.columnconfigure(1, weight=1)
43 self.myContainer.pack(expand="yes", fill="both")
44
45 self.fullfile = None
46 self.conditions = None
47 self.prgrun = False
48 self.curverun = False
49 self.plotcurve = False
50
51 self.createWidgets()
52
53 def createWidgets(self):
54 self.createFile()
55 self.createTerminal()
56 self.createOptions()
57 self.createGraphs()
58
59 def createFile(self):
60 files = ttk.Frame(self.myContainer)
61 files.columnconfigure(1, weight=1)
62 label = ttk.Label(files, text="Select a file to open:")
63 entry = ttk.Entry(files)
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64 button = ttk.Button(files, text="Browse...", ...
command=lambda e=entry : self.fileDialog(e))
65 button2 = ttk.Button(files, text="Start", command=lambda ...
: self.startInitial())
66
67 label.grid(row=0, column=0)
68 entry.grid(row=0, column=1, sticky="ew")
69 button.grid(row=0, column=2)
70 button2.grid(row=0, column=3)
71 files.grid(sticky="ew")
72
73 def fileDialog(self, entry):
74 opts = {"initialfile": entry.get(),
75 "filetypes": (("Text files", ".txt"),
76 ("All files", ".*"),)}
77 opts["title"] = "Select a file to open..."
78 self.fullfile = filedialog.askopenfilename(**opts)
79 if self.fullfile:
80 entry.delete(0, "end")
81 entry.insert("end", self.fullfile)
82 self.conditions = None
83 self.md.delete(0, "end")
84 self.ov.delete(0, "end")
85 self.thr.delete(0, "end")
86 self.tem.delete(0, "end")
87 self.ad.delete(0, "end")
88 self.startd.delete(0, "end")
89 self.endd.delete(0, "end")
90 self.maxd.delete(0, "end")
91 self.numd.delete(0, "end")
92
93 def startInitial(self):
94 if self.fullfile:
95 print "Starting Program ..."
96 self.conditions = fn.extract(self.fullfile)
97 self.path = os.path.dirname(self.fullfile) + os.sep
98 self.filename = self.conditions[0]
99 self.name = self.conditions[1]
100 self.reset()
101 print "File Opened"
102
103 def createTerminal(self):
104 disp = ttk.Labelframe(self.myContainer, text="Display")
105 disp.grid(row=2, column=0, sticky="nsew")
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106
107 self.term = tk.Text(disp)
108 self.term.pack(fill="both", expand="yes")
109 sys.stdout = printTerm(self.term)
110 sys.stderr = printTerm(self.term)
111
112 def createOptions(self):
113 opts = ttk.Labelframe(self.myContainer, text="Options")
114 opts.grid(row=1, column=0, sticky="nsew")
115
116 self.note = ttk.Notebook(opts)
117 self.optsConditions()
118 self.optsSave()
119 self.optsCurve()
120 self.note.pack(expand="yes", fill="both")
121
122 def optsConditions(self):
123 self.pg1 = ttk.Frame(self.note)
124 self.note.add(self.pg1, text="Conditions")
125 self.pg1.rowconfigure(0, weight=1)
126 self.pg1.rowconfigure(1, weight=1)
127 self.pg1.columnconfigure(0, weight=1)
128 self.pg1.columnconfigure(1, weight=1)
129
130 detector = ttk.Labelframe(self.pg1, text="Detector")
131 detector.grid(columnspan=2, sticky="nsew")
132 detector.rowconfigure(0, weight=1)
133 detector.rowconfigure(1, weight=1)
134 detector.columnconfigure(1, weight=1)
135 detector.columnconfigure(3, weight=1)
136
137 lbl1 = ttk.Label(detector, text="Model:")
138 self.md = ttk.Entry(detector)
139 lbl2 = ttk.Label(detector, text="Over Voltage:")
140 self.ov = ttk.Entry(detector)
141 lbl3 = ttk.Label(detector, text="Threshold:")
142 self.thr = ttk.Entry(detector)
143 lbl4 = ttk.Label(detector, text="Temperature:")
144 self.tem = ttk.Entry(detector)
145 lbl1.grid(row=0, column=0)
146 self.md.grid(row=0, column=1, sticky="ew")
147 lbl2.grid(row=1, column=0)
148 self.ov.grid(row=1, column=1, sticky="ew")
149 lbl3.grid(row=1, column=2)
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150 self.thr.grid(row=1, column=3, sticky="ew")
151 lbl4.grid(row=0, column=2)
152 self.tem.grid(row=0, column=3, sticky="ew")
153
154 initial = ttk.Labelframe(self.pg1, text="Data")
155 initial.grid(columnspan=2, sticky="nsew")
156 initial.rowconfigure(0, weight=1)
157 initial.rowconfigure(1, weight=1)
158 initial.rowconfigure(2, weight=1)
159 initial.columnconfigure(1, weight=1)
160 initial.columnconfigure(3, weight=1)
161
162 lbl5 = ttk.Label(initial, text="a:")
163 self.ad = ttk.Entry(initial)
164 self.ad.bind("<FocusOut>", lambda event: self.changeMax())
165 lbl6 = ttk.Label(initial, text="Starting Bin Size:")
166 self.startd = ttk.Entry(initial)
167 self.startd.bind("<FocusOut>", lambda event : ...
self.changeMax())
168 lbl7 = ttk.Label(initial, text="Maximum Bins:")
169 self.maxd = ttk.Entry(initial)
170 self.maxd.bind("<FocusOut>", lambda event : self.changeA())
171 lbl8 = ttk.Label(initial, text="Endtime:")
172 self.endd = ttk.Entry(initial)
173 self.endd.bind("<FocusOut>", lambda event : self.changeMax())
174 lbl9 = ttk.Label(initial, text="Number of Data Points:")
175 self.numd = ttk.Entry(initial)
176 lbl5.grid(row=0, column=0)
177 self.ad.grid(row=0, column=1, sticky="ew")
178 lbl6.grid(row=1, column=0)
179 self.startd.grid(row=1, column=1, sticky="ew")
180 lbl7.grid(row=0, column=2)
181 self.maxd.grid(row=0, column=3, sticky="ew")
182 lbl8.grid(row=1, column=2)
183 self.endd.grid(row=1, column=3, sticky="ew")
184 lbl9.grid(row=2, column=0)
185 self.numd.grid(row=2, column=1, sticky="ew")
186
187 button = ttk.Button(self.pg1, text="Reset to Default", ...
command=lambda : self.reset())
188 button.grid(row=2, column=0, sticky="ew")
189 button2 = ttk.Button(self.pg1, text="Run", command=lambda ...
: self.runprg())
190 button2.grid(row=2, column=1, sticky="ew")
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191
192 def changeMax(self):
193 if self.conditions:
194 newa = float(self.ad.get())
195 self.maxd.delete(0, "end")
196 self.maxd.insert("end", fn.getmaxbins(newa, ...
float(self.startd.get()), float(self.endd.get())))
197
198 def changeA(self):
199 if self.conditions:
200 newm = int(self.maxd.get())
201 self.ad.delete(0, "end")
202 self.ad.insert("end", fn.geta(newm, ...
float(self.startd.get()), float(self.endd.get())))
203
204 def reset(self):
205 if self.conditions:
206 self.md.delete(0, "end")
207 self.md.insert("end", self.conditions[2])
208 self.ov.delete(0, "end")
209 self.ov.insert("end", self.conditions[4])
210 self.thr.delete(0, "end")
211 self.thr.insert("end", self.conditions[5])
212 self.tem.delete(0, "end")
213 self.tem.insert("end", self.conditions[3])
214 self.ad.delete(0, "end")
215 self.ad.insert("end", df.a)
216 self.startd.delete(0, "end")
217 self.startd.insert("end", df.start)
218 self.endd.delete(0, "end")
219 self.endd.insert("end", df.endtime)
220 self.maxd.delete(0, "end")
221 self.maxd.insert("end", df.maxbins)
222 self.numd.delete(0, "end")
223 self.numd.insert("end", df.numofdata)
224
225 def runprg(self):
226 if self.conditions:
227 print "Running Program ..."
228
229 self.model = self.md.get()
230 self.over = self.ov.get()
231 self.thres = self.thr.get()
232 self.temp = self.tem.get()
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233 self.a = float(self.ad.get())
234 self.start = float(self.startd.get())
235 self.endtime = float(self.endd.get())
236 self.maxbins = int(self.maxd.get())
237 self.numofdata = int(self.numd.get())
238 print "...%i", self.numofdata
239 self.actualdata = fn.parsedata(self.fullfile, ...
self.numofdata)
240 self.lastnum = fn.last(self.actualdata, self.endtime)
241 self.overalltime = ...
(self.actualdata[len(self.actualdata)−1] − ...
self.actualdata[0]) * df.resolution
242 self.avgdcs = len(self.actualdata) / self.overalltime
243 self.binedges = fn.bins(self.maxbins, self.start, self.a)
244
245 self.differenced = fn.differences(self.lastnum, ...
self.maxbins, self.actualdata, self.start, ...
self.a, self.endtime)
246 self.diffdata = self.differenced[0]
247 self.errors = self.differenced[1]
248 self.numberofalldiffs = self.differenced[2]
249 self.normed = fn.norm(self.lastnum, self.maxbins, ...
self.diffdata, self.binedges)
250 self.logged = fn.log(self.normed, self.maxbins)
251
252 self.dc = fn.dark(self.normed, 5, self.maxbins)
253 self.darkcount = (self.normed[−2] + self.normed[−3] + ...
self.normed[−4]) / 3
254 self.af = fn.area(self.darkcount, self.normed, ...
self.binedges, self.maxbins)
255 self.afarea = self.af[0]
256 self.afsums = self.af[1]
257 self.afarray = self.af[2]
258 self.afpercent = self.afarea * 100
259
260 self.rowdata = [self.name, self.model, self.temp, ...
self.over, self.thres, self.avgdcs, ...
self.darkcount, self.afpercent, self.maxbins, ...
self.a, self.numofdata, self.overalltime, ...
self.endtime, self.numberofalldiffs, self.lastnum]
261 self.headers = ["Filename", "Model", "Temperature", ...
"Over Voltage", "Comparator Threshold", "Average ...
Dark Counts", "Real Dark Counts", "Afterpulse ...
Percentage", "Number of Bins", "a", "Length of ...
132
Data Used", "Overall Time", "Endtime", "Number of ...
Differences", "Last Number"]
262 fn.writetable(self.rowdata, self.headers, self.path)
263
264 self.x = ...
np.array(range(self.maxbins+1)[self.normed.index(max(self.normed)):len(self.normed)])
265 self.y = ...
np.array(self.normed[self.normed.index(max(self.normed)):len(self.normed)])
266
267 print "Done Processing"
268 print "Dark Count: %s" % self.darkcount
269 print "Afterpulse Percentage: %s" % self.afpercent
270 self.drawGraphs()
271 self.prgrun = True
272
273 def optsSave(self):
274 self.pg2 = ttk.Frame(self.note)
275 self.note.add(self.pg2, text="Save Files")
276 for row in range(1, 7):
277 self.pg2.rowconfigure(row, weight=2)
278 self.pg2.rowconfigure(0, weight=1)
279 self.pg2.columnconfigure(0, weight = 1)
280 self.pg2.columnconfigure(1, weight = 1)
281 self.pg2.columnconfigure(2, weight = 1)
282
283 title = ttk.Label(self.pg2, text="Select Data to Save")
284 saveas = ttk.Label(self.pg2, text="Save File As")
285 title.grid(row=0, column=0, sticky="ew")
286 saveas.grid(row=0, column=1, sticky="ew")
287
288 self.var1 = tk.IntVar()
289 self.var2 = tk.IntVar()
290 self.var3 = tk.IntVar()
291 self.var4 = tk.IntVar()
292 self.var5 = tk.IntVar()
293 self.var6 = tk.IntVar()
294 self.button1 = ttk.Checkbutton(self.pg2, ...
text="Conditions", variable = self.var1, ...
command=lambda num=1: self.showName(num))
295 self.button2 = ttk.Checkbutton(self.pg2, ...
text="Differenced", variable = self.var2, ...
command=lambda num=2: self.showName(num))
296 self.button3 = ttk.Checkbutton(self.pg2, ...
text="Normalized", variable = self.var3, ...
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command=lambda num=3: self.showName(num))
297 self.button4 = ttk.Checkbutton(self.pg2, text="Logged", ...
variable = self.var4, command=lambda num=4: ...
self.showName(num))
298 self.button5 = ttk.Checkbutton(self.pg2, text="Errors", ...
variable = self.var5, command=lambda num=5: ...
self.showName(num))
299 self.button6 = ttk.Checkbutton(self.pg2, ...
text="All−in−One", variable = self.var6, ...
command=lambda num=6: self.showName(num))
300 self.button1.grid(row=1, column=0, sticky="ew")
301 self.button2.grid(row=4, column=0, sticky="ew")
302 self.button3.grid(row=2, column=0, sticky="ew")
303 self.button4.grid(row=5, column=0, sticky="ew")
304 self.button5.grid(row=3, column=0, sticky="ew")
305 self.button6.grid(row=6, column=0, sticky="ew")
306
307 self.entry1 = ttk.Entry(self.pg2)
308 self.entry2 = ttk.Entry(self.pg2)
309 self.entry3 = ttk.Entry(self.pg2)
310 self.entry4 = ttk.Entry(self.pg2)
311 self.entry5 = ttk.Entry(self.pg2)
312 self.entry6 = ttk.Entry(self.pg2)
313 self.entry1.grid(row=1, column=1, sticky="ew")
314 self.entry2.grid(row=4, column=1, sticky="ew")
315 self.entry3.grid(row=2, column=1, sticky="ew")
316 self.entry4.grid(row=5, column=1, sticky="ew")
317 self.entry5.grid(row=3, column=1, sticky="ew")
318 self.entry6.grid(row=6, column=1, sticky="ew")
319
320 self.res = ttk.Button(self.pg2, text="Reset to Default ...
Names", command = lambda : self.resetName())
321 self.res.grid(row=3, column=2, sticky="ew")
322 self.save = ttk.Button(self.pg2, text="Save Files", ...
command = lambda : self.saveFiles())
323 self.save.grid(row=4, column=2, sticky="ew")
324
325 def showName(self, num):
326 if self.conditions:
327 self.resetName()
328
329 def resetName(self):
330 if self.conditions:
331 if self.var1.get():
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332 self.entry1.delete(0, "end")
333 self.entry1.insert("end", self.name + " " + ...
str(self.a) + " conds.txt")
334 else:
335 self.entry1.delete(0, "end")
336 if self.var2.get():
337 self.entry2.delete(0, "end")
338 self.entry2.insert("end", self.name + " " + ...
str(self.a) + " diffdata.txt")
339 else:
340 self.entry2.delete(0, "end")
341 if self.var3.get():
342 self.entry3.delete(0, "end")
343 self.entry3.insert("end", self.name + " " + ...
str(self.a) + " normed.txt")
344 else:
345 self.entry3.delete(0, "end")
346 if self.var4.get():
347 self.entry4.delete(0, "end")
348 self.entry4.insert("end", self.name + " " + ...
str(self.a) + " logged.txt")
349 else:
350 self.entry4.delete(0, "end")
351 if self.var5.get():
352 self.entry5.delete(0, "end")
353 self.entry5.insert("end", self.name + " " + ...
str(self.a) + " errors.txt")
354 else:
355 self.entry5.delete(0, "end")
356 if self.var6.get():
357 self.entry6.delete(0, "end")
358 self.entry6.insert("end", self.name + " " + ...
str(self.a) + " all.txt")
359 else:
360 self.entry6.delete(0, "end")
361
362 if self.prgrun:
363 if self.var7.get():
364 self.entry7.delete(0, "end")
365 self.entry7.insert("end", "1")
366 else:
367 self.entry7.delete(0, "end")
368 if self.var8.get():
369 self.entry8.delete(0, "end")
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370 self.entry8.insert("end", "1")
371 else:
372 self.entry8.delete(0, "end")
373 if self.var9.get():
374 self.entry9.delete(0, "end")
375 self.entry9.insert("end", "1")
376 else:
377 self.entry9.delete(0, "end")
378 if self.var10.get():
379 self.entry10.delete(0, "end")
380 self.entry10.insert("end", "1")
381 else:
382 self.entry10.delete(0, "end")
383 if self.var11.get():
384 self.entry11.delete(0, "end")
385 self.entry11.insert("end", "1")
386 else:
387 self.entry11.delete(0, "end")
388
389
390 def saveFiles(self):
391 if self.prgrun:
392 print "Saving Files ..."
393 newdirec = self.filename + " " + str(self.a)
394 fn.makedirec(newdirec)
395 if self.entry1.get()[−4:] != ".txt":
396 new1 = newdirec + os.sep + self.entry1.get() + ".txt"
397 else:
398 new1 = newdirec + os.sep + self.entry1.get()
399 if self.entry2.get()[−4:] != ".txt":
400 new2 = newdirec + os.sep + self.entry2.get() + ".txt"
401 else:
402 new2 = newdirec + os.sep + self.entry2.get()
403 if self.entry3.get()[−4:] != ".txt":
404 new3 = newdirec + os.sep + self.entry3.get() + ".txt"
405 else:
406 new3 = newdirec + os.sep + self.entry3.get()
407 if self.entry4.get()[−4:] != ".txt":
408 new4 = newdirec + os.sep + self.entry4.get() + ".txt"
409 else:
410 new4 = newdirec + os.sep + self.entry4.get()
411 if self.entry5.get()[−4:] != ".txt":
412 new5 = newdirec + os.sep + self.entry5.get() + ".txt"
413 else:
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414 new5 = newdirec + os.sep + self.entry5.get()
415 if self.entry6.get()[−4:] != ".txt":
416 new6 = newdirec + os.sep + self.entry6.get() + ".txt"
417 else:
418 new6 = newdirec + os.sep + self.entry6.get()
419
420 allconds = {"filename": self.name,"model": ...
self.model, "temp": self.temp, "over": self.over, ...
"threshold": self.thres, "a": self.a, "start": ...
self.start, "endtime": self.endtime, "maxbins": ...
self.maxbins, "numberofdata": self.numofdata}
421 allinone = {"conditions": allconds, "diffdata": ...
self.diffdata, "normed": self.normed, "logged": ...
self.logged, "errors": self.errors}
422
423 if self.var1.get():
424 fn.wwithnames(new1, allconds)
425 if self.var2.get():
426 fn.writeto(new2, self.diffdata)
427 if self.var3.get():
428 fn.writeto(new3, self.normed)
429 if self.var4.get():
430 fn.writeto(new4, self.logged)
431 if self.var5.get():
432 fn.writeto(new5, self.errors)
433 if self.var6.get():
434 fn.wwithnames(new6, allinone)
435
436 print "Files Saved"
437
438 def optsCurve(self):
439 self.pg4 = ttk.Frame(self.note)
440 self.note.add(self.pg4, text="Curve Fitting")
441
442 for row in range(1, 6):
443 self.pg4.rowconfigure(row, weight=2)
444 self.pg4.rowconfigure(0, weight=1)
445 self.pg4.columnconfigure(0, weight = 1)
446 self.pg4.columnconfigure(1, weight = 1)
447 self.pg4.columnconfigure(2, weight = 1)
448 self.pg4.columnconfigure(3, weight = 1)
449 self.pg4.columnconfigure(4, weight = 1)
450
451 title = ttk.Label(self.pg4, text="Number of e")
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452 params = ttk.Label(self.pg4, text="Initial Parameter (a ...
power of 10 i.e. 10000)")
453 colour = ttk.Label(self.pg4, text="Line Colour")
454 title.grid(row=0, column=0, sticky="ew")
455 params.grid(row=0, column=1, sticky="ew")
456 colour.grid(row=0, column=2, sticky="ew")
457
458 self.var7 = tk.IntVar()
459 self.var8 = tk.IntVar()
460 self.var9 = tk.IntVar()
461 self.var10 = tk.IntVar()
462 self.var11 = tk.IntVar()
463 self.button7 = ttk.Checkbutton(self.pg4, text="1", ...
variable = self.var7, command = lambda num=7: ...
self.showName(num))
464 self.button8 = ttk.Checkbutton(self.pg4, text="2", ...
variable = self.var8, command = lambda num=8: ...
self.showName(num))
465 self.button9 = ttk.Checkbutton(self.pg4, text="3", ...
variable = self.var9, command = lambda num=9: ...
self.showName(num))
466 self.button10 = ttk.Checkbutton(self.pg4, text="4", ...
variable = self.var10, command = lambda num=10: ...
self.showName(num))
467 self.button11 = ttk.Checkbutton(self.pg4, text="5", ...
variable = self.var11, command = lambda num=11: ...
self.showName(num))
468 self.button7.grid(row=1, column=0, sticky="ew")
469 self.button8.grid(row=2, column=0, sticky="ew")
470 self.button9.grid(row=3, column=0, sticky="ew")
471 self.button10.grid(row=4, column=0, sticky="ew")
472 self.button11.grid(row=5, column=0, sticky="ew")
473
474 self.entry7 = ttk.Entry(self.pg4)
475 self.entry8 = ttk.Entry(self.pg4)
476 self.entry9 = ttk.Entry(self.pg4)
477 self.entry10 = ttk.Entry(self.pg4)
478 self.entry11 = ttk.Entry(self.pg4)
479 self.entry7.grid(row=1, column=1, sticky="ew")
480 self.entry8.grid(row=2, column=1, sticky="ew")
481 self.entry9.grid(row=3, column=1, sticky="ew")
482 self.entry10.grid(row=4, column=1, sticky="ew")
483 self.entry11.grid(row=5, column=1, sticky="ew")
484
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485 label1 = ttk.Label(self.pg4, text="Blue")
486 label1.grid(row=1, column=2, sticky="ew")
487 label2 = ttk.Label(self.pg4, text="Red")
488 label2.grid(row=2, column=2, sticky="ew")
489 label3 = ttk.Label(self.pg4, text="Yellow")
490 label3.grid(row=3, column=2, sticky="ew")
491 label4 = ttk.Label(self.pg4, text="Cyan")
492 label4.grid(row=4, column=2, sticky="ew")
493 label5 = ttk.Label(self.pg4, text="Magenta")
494 label5.grid(row=5, column=2, sticky="ew")
495
496 self.plot = ttk.Button(self.pg4, text="Plot Curve Fits", ...
command = lambda : self.plotCurve())
497 self.plot.grid(row=2, column=3, sticky="ew")
498 self.save1 = ttk.Button(self.pg4, text="Save Graph", ...
command = lambda : self.saveGraph())
499 self.save1.grid(row=3, column=3, sticky="ew")
500 self.save2 = ttk.Button(self.pg4, text="Save Params", ...
command = lambda : self.saveParams())
501 self.save2.grid(row=4, column=3, sticky="ew")
502 self.entry12 = ttk.Entry(self.pg4)
503 self.entry13 = ttk.Entry(self.pg4)
504 self.entry12.grid(row=3, column=4, sticky="ew")
505 self.entry13.grid(row=4, column=4, sticky="ew")
506 label6 = ttk.Label(self.pg4, text="File Names")
507 label6.grid(row=0, column=4, sticky="ew")
508
509 def f1(self, x, b, c):
510 return b * np.exp(−c * self.start * self.a**x) + ...
self.darkcount
511
512 def f2(self, x, b, c, f, g):
513 return b * np.exp(−c * self.start * self.a**x) + f * ...
np.exp(−g * self.start * self.a**x) + self.darkcount
514
515 def f3(self, x, b, c, f, g, h, i):
516 return b * np.exp(−c * self.start * self.a**x) + f * ...
np.exp(−g * self.start * self.a**x) + h * np.exp(−i * ...
self.start * self.a**x) + self.darkcount
517
518 def f4(self, x, b, c, f, g, h, i, j, k):
519 return b * np.exp(−c * self.start * self.a**x) + f * ...
np.exp(−g * self.start * self.a**x) + h * np.exp(−i * ...
self.start * self.a**x) + j * np.exp(−k * self.start ...
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* self.a**x) + self.darkcount
520
521 def f5(self, x, b, c, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m):
522 return b * np.exp(−c * self.start * self.a**x) + f * ...
np.exp(−g * self.start * self.a**x) + h * np.exp(−i * ...
self.start * self.a**x) + j * np.exp(−k * self.start ...
* self.a**x) + l * np.exp(−m * self.start * ...
self.a**x) + self.darkcount
523
524 def f6(self, x, b, c, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o):
525 return self.f5(x, b, c, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m)+ n * ...
np.exp(−o * self.start * self.a**x)
526
527 def plotCurve(self):
528 if self.prgrun:
529 self.params1 = []
530 self.params2 = []
531 self.params3 = []
532 self.params4 = []
533 self.params5 = []
534 self.params6 = []
535
536 if self.var7.get():
537 print "Curve fitting 1 ..."
538 try:
539 p1 = int(self.entry7.get())
540 self.params1, covariance1 = ...
curve fit(self.f1, self.x, self.y, p0=[1, ...
p1])
541 print self.params1
542 except RuntimeError:
543 print "Fitting Error: Please change Initial ...
Parameters and try again"
544 return
545 if self.var8.get():
546 print "Curve fitting 2 ..."
547 try:
548 p2 = int(self.entry8.get())
549 self.params2, covariance2 = ...
curve fit(self.f2, self.x, self.y, ...
p0=[1,p2,1,p2])
550 print self.params2
551 except RuntimeError:
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552 print "Fitting Error: Please change Initial ...
Parameters and try again"
553 return
554 if self.var9.get():
555 print "Curve fitting 3 ..."
556 try:
557 p3 = int(self.entry9.get())
558 self.params3, covariance3 = ...
curve fit(self.f3, self.x, self.y, ...
p0=[1,p3,1,p3,1,p3])
559 print self.params3
560 except RuntimeError:
561 print "Fitting Error: Please change Initial ...
Parameters and try again"
562 return
563 if self.var10.get():
564 print "Curve fitting 4 ..."
565 try:
566 #p4 = int(self.entry10.get())
567 #self.params4, covariance4 = ...
curve fit(self.f4, self.x, self.y, ...
p0=[1,p4,1,p4,1,p4,1,p4])
568 self.params4, covariance4 = ...
curve fit(self.f4, self.x, self.y, ...
maxfev=50000)
569 print self.params4
570 #except RuntimeError:
571 except Exception as err:
572 print type(err)
573 print err.args
574 print err
575 print "Fitting Error: Please change Initial ...
Parameters and try again"
576 return
577 if self.var11.get():
578 print "Curve fitting 5 ..."
579 try:
580 #p5 = int(self.entry11.get())
581 #self.params5, covariance5 = ...
curve fit(self.f5, self.x, self.y, ...
p0=[1,p5,1,p5,1,p5,1,p5,1,p5])
582 #self.params5, covariance5 = ...
curve fit(self.f5, self.x, self.y, ...
p0=[1,p5,1,p5,1,p5,1,p5,1,p5])
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583 #p0=[30, 30000, 0, 0, 350, 1700000, 400, ...
1700000, 100, 300000]
584 self.params5, covariance5 = ...
curve fit(self.f5, self.x, self.y, ...
maxfev=50000)
585 #self.params6, covariance6 = ...
curve fit(self.f6, self.x, self.y, ...
maxfev=50000)
586 print self.params5
587 #print self.params6
588 #except RuntimeError:
589 except Exception as err:
590 print err
591 print "Fitting Error: Please change Initial ...
Parameters and try again"
592 return
593 print "Plotting Curve Fitted Graph ..."
594
595 if self.plotcurve:
596 self.gphf3.destroy()
597
598 #timesinsec = [0, 10**−9, 10**−8, 10**−7, 10**−6, ...
10**−5, 10**−4, 10**−3, 10**−2, 10**−1, 0, 0.5, 1,2]
599 timesinsec = [0, 10**−9, 10**−8, 10**−7, 10**−6, ...
10**−5, 10**−4, 10**−3, 10**−2, 10**−1, 1, 10**1]
600 times = [0, '1 ns', '10 ns', '100 ns', r'$10ˆ{−6}$', ...
r'$10ˆ{−5}$',r'$10ˆ{−4}$',r'$10ˆ{−3}$',r'$10ˆ{−2}$',r'$10ˆ{−1}$', ...
r'$10ˆ{0}$']
601 numfortime = fn.time(timesinsec, self.start, self.a)
602 checked = False
603
604 self.gphf3 = ttk.Frame(self.gph3)
605 self.gphf3.pack(fill="both", expand="yes")
606 self.fig3 = plt.figure()
607 plt.bar(range(self.maxbins+1), self.normed, log=True, ...
width=1, color='0.5', edgecolor='w')
608 plt.xticks(numfortime, times)
609 plt.ylabel("Dark count probability $sˆ{−1}$")
610 plt.xlabel("Time after click")
611 plt.grid(axis="both")
612 #self.params5i = [ 7.70588954e+04, 8.38545084e+05, ...
8.37291039e+04, 9.26471484e+05, \
613 # 1.3 * 1.80974878e+00, 0.9 * ...
1.72225219e+03, −1.59868460e+05, 8.81143768e+05, ...
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1 * 3.84207195e+01, 3.49983366e+04]
614 if self.var7.get():
615 plt.plot(self.x, self.f1(self.x, *self.params1), ...
'b', linewidth=1.5)
616 checked = True
617 if self.var8.get():
618 plt.plot(self.x, self.f2(self.x, *self.params2), ...
'r', linewidth=1.5)
619 checked = True
620 if self.var9.get():
621 plt.plot(self.x, self.f3(self.x, *self.params3), ...
'y', linewidth=1.5)
622 checked = True
623 if self.var10.get():
624 plt.plot(self.x, self.f4(self.x, *self.params4), ...
'c', linewidth=1.5)
625 checked = True
626 if self.var11.get():
627 plt.plot(self.x, self.f5(self.x, *self.params5), ...
'm', linewidth=1.5)
628 #plt.plot(self.x, self.f6(self.x, *self.params6), ...
'g', linewidth=1.5)
629 #plt.plot(self.x, self.f5(self.x, ...
*self.params5i), 'p', linewidth=1.5)
630 checked = True
631 self.canvas3 = FigureCanvasTkAgg(self.fig3, self.gphf3)
632 self.canvas3.show()
633 self.canvas3.get tk widget().pack(fill="both", ...
expand="yes")
634 toolbar = NavigationToolbar2TkAgg(self.canvas3, ...
self.gphf3)
635 toolbar.update()
636 self.canvas3. tkcanvas.pack(fill="both", expand="yes")
637
638 newfilename = self.name + " " + str(self.a) + " " + ...
"CurveFitted"
639
640 if checked:
641 self.entry12.delete(0, "end")
642 self.entry12.insert("end", newfilename + ".pdf")
643 self.entry13.delete(0, "end")
644 self.entry13.insert("end", newfilename + ...
"Params.txt")
645
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646 self.plotcurve = True
647 print "Done Plotting"
648
649 def saveGraph(self):
650 if self.plotcurve:
651 timesinsec = [0, 10**−9, 10**−8, 10**−7, 0.5*10**−6, ...
10**−6, 10**−5, 10**−4, 10**−3, 10**−2, ...
10**−1,0.5, 1, 2]
652 times = [0, '1 ns', '10 ns', '100 ns', ...
r'$\frac{1}{2}$ $\mu$s', r'1 $\mu$s', r'10 ...
$\mu$s',r'100 $\mu$s',r'$\frac{1}{1000}$ ...
s',r'$\frac{1}{100}$ s',r'$\frac{1}{10}$ s', ...
r'$\frac{1}{2}$ s', 1, 2]
653 numfortime = fn.time(timesinsec, self.start, self.a)
654
655 newdirec = self.filename + " " + str(self.a)
656 fn.makedirec(newdirec)
657 if self.entry12.get()[−4:] != ".pdf":
658 newfilename = newdirec + os.sep + ...
self.entry12.get() + ".pdf"
659 else:
660 newfilename = newdirec + os.sep + self.entry12.get()
661
662 plt.figure(figsize=(18,9))
663 plt.bar(range(self.maxbins+1), self.normed, width=1, ...
color='0.5', edgecolor='w')
664 plt.xticks(numfortime, times)
665 plt.grid(axis="both")
666 if self.var7.get():
667 plt.plot(self.x, self.f1(self.x, *self.params1), ...
'b', linewidth=1.5)
668 if self.var8.get():
669 plt.plot(self.x, self.f2(self.x, *self.params2), ...
'r', linewidth=1.5)
670 if self.var9.get():
671 plt.plot(self.x, self.f3(self.x, *self.params3), ...
'y', linewidth=1.5)
672 if self.var10.get():
673 plt.plot(self.x, self.f4(self.x, *self.params4), ...
'c', linewidth=1.5)
674 if self.var11.get():
675 plt.plot(self.x, self.f5(self.x, *self.params5), ...
'm', linewidth=1.5)
676
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677
678 plt.savefig(newfilename)
679 print "Graph Saved"
680
681 def saveParams(self):
682 if self.plotcurve:
683 newdirec = self.filename + " " + str(self.a)
684 fn.makedirec(newdirec)
685 if self.entry13.get()[−4:] != ".txt":
686 newfilename = newdirec + os.sep + ...
self.entry13.get() + ".txt"
687 else:
688 newfilename = newdirec + os.sep + self.entry13.get()
689 params = {"1 Exponent": self.params1, "2 Exponents": ...
self.params2, "3 Exponents": self.params3, "4 ...
Exponents": self.params4, "5 Exponents": ...
self.params5}
690 fn.wwithnames(newfilename, params)
691 print "Params Saved"
692
693 def createGraphs(self):
694 gphs = ttk.Labelframe(self.myContainer, text="Graphs")
695 gphs.grid(row=0, column=1, rowspan=3, sticky="nsew")
696
697 self.gphNote = ttk.Notebook(gphs)
698 self.gphNorm()
699 self.gphLog()
700 self.gphCurve()
701 self.gphNote.pack(expand="yes", fill="both")
702
703 def gphNorm(self):
704 self.gph1 = ttk.Frame(self.gphNote)
705 self.gphNote.add(self.gph1, text="Normed")
706
707 def gphLog(self):
708 self.gph2 = ttk.Frame(self.gphNote)
709 self.gphNote.add(self.gph2, text="Logged")
710
711 def gphCurve(self):
712 self.gph3 = ttk.Frame(self.gphNote)
713 self.gphNote.add(self.gph3, text="Curve Fitted")
714
715 def drawGraphs(self):
716 if self.prgrun:
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717 self.gphf1.destroy()
718 self.gphf2.destroy()
719
720 print "Drawing Graphs ..."
721 #timesinsec = [0, 10**−9, 10**−8, 10**−7, 10**−6, 10**−5, ...
10**−4, 10**−3, 10**−2, 10**−1,0.5, 1, 2]
722 timesinsec = [10**−9, 10**−8, 10**−7, 10**−6, 10**−5, ...
10**−4, 10**−3, 10**−2, 10**−1, 1]
723 #times = [0, '$10ˆ{−9}$', '10 ns', '100 ns', r'1 $\mu$s', ...
r'10 $\mu$s',r'100 $\mu$s',r'$\frac{1}{1000}$ ...
s',r'$\frac{1}{100}$ s',r'$\frac{1}{10}$ s', ...
r'$\frac{1}{2}$ s', 1, 2]
724 times = ['$10ˆ{−9}$', '$10ˆ{−8}$', '$10ˆ{−7}$', ...
r'$10ˆ{−6}$', ...
r'$10ˆ{−5}$',r'$10ˆ{−4}$',r'$10ˆ{−3}$',r'$10ˆ{−2}$',r'$10ˆ{−1}$', ...
'$10ˆ0$']
725 numfortime = fn.time(timesinsec, self.start, self.a)
726
727 self.gphf1 = ttk.Frame(self.gph1)
728 self.gphf1.pack(fill="both", expand="yes")
729 self.fig1 = plt.figure()
730 plt.bar(range(self.maxbins+1), self.normed, width=1, ...
color='0.5', edgecolor='w')
731 plt.xticks(numfortime, times)
732 plt.grid(axis="both")
733 self.canvas1 = FigureCanvasTkAgg(self.fig1, self.gphf1)
734 self.canvas1.show()
735 self.canvas1.get tk widget().pack(fill="both", expand="yes")
736 toolbar = NavigationToolbar2TkAgg(self.canvas1, self.gphf1)
737 toolbar.update()
738 self.canvas1. tkcanvas.pack(fill="both", expand="yes")
739
740 self.gphf2 = ttk.Frame(self.gph2)
741 self.gphf2.pack(fill="both", expand="yes")
742 self.fig2 = plt.figure()
743 plt.ylim(10**(−2), 10**4)
744 print self.maxbins
745 plt.bar(range(self.maxbins+1), self.normed, log=True, ...
width=1, color='0.5', edgecolor='w')
746 plt.xticks(numfortime, times)
747 #plt.xlim(10**(−9), 10**0)
748 #plt.xscale('log')
749 plt.grid(axis="both")
750 plt.ylabel("Dark count probability $sˆ{−1}$")
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751 plt.xlabel("Time after click")
752 self.canvas2 = FigureCanvasTkAgg(self.fig2, self.gphf2)
753 self.canvas2.show()
754 self.canvas2.get tk widget().pack(fill="both", expand="yes")
755 toolbar2 = NavigationToolbar2TkAgg(self.canvas2, self.gphf2)
756 toolbar2.update()
757 self.canvas2. tkcanvas.pack(fill="both", expand="yes")
758 print "Done Plotting"
759 print "Saving Graphs"
760
761 timesinsec1 = [0, 10**−9, 10**−8, 10**−7, 0.5*10**−6, ...
10**−6, 10**−5, 10**−4, 10**−3, 10**−2, 10**−1,0.5, ...
1, 2]
762 times1 = [0, '1 ns', '10 ns', '100 ns', r'$\frac{1}{2}$ ...
$\mu$s', r'1 $\mu$s', r'10 $\mu$s',r'100 ...
$\mu$s',r'$\frac{1}{1000}$ s',r'$\frac{1}{100}$ ...
s',r'$\frac{1}{10}$ s', r'$\frac{1}{2}$ s', 1, 2]
763 numfortime1 = fn.time(timesinsec1, self.start, self.a)
764
765 newdirec = self.filename + " " + str(self.a)
766 fn.makedirec(newdirec)
767 newfilename = newdirec + os.sep + self.name + " " + ...
str(self.a)
768
769 plt.figure(figsize=(18,9))
770 plt.bar(range(self.maxbins+1), self.normed, width=1, ...
color='0.5', edgecolor='w')
771 plt.xticks(numfortime1, times1)
772 plt.grid(axis="both")
773 plt.savefig(newfilename + ".pdf")
774
775 plt.figure(figsize=(18,9))
776 plt.bar(range(self.maxbins+1), self.logged, width=1, ...
color='0.5', edgecolor='w')
777 plt.xticks(numfortime1, times1)
778 plt.grid(axis='both')
779 plt.savefig(newfilename + " logged.pdf")
780
781 print "Graphs Saved"
782
783
784 root = tk.Tk()
785 program = Program(root)
786 root.mainloop()
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